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ACRONYMS
ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable
APT Average Power Test
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ATR Advanced Test Reactor
ATRC Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility
CAM Constant Air Monitor
CCA Criticality Control Area
DBR Design Basis Report
DNBR Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio
DOE Department of Energy
DOP Detailed Operating Procedure
DOT Department of Transportation
EOC End Of Cycle
ESAP Experiment Safety Assurance Package
FIR Flow Instability Ratio
GE General Electric
GWd/MT GigaWatt Days per Metric Ton
HCC Hot Cell Carrier
HCF Hot Cell Facility
INEEL Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
LHGR Linear Heat Generation Rate
LMITCO Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company
LWR Light Water Reactor
MCP Management Control Procedure
MOX Mixed Uranium and Plutonium Oxide
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory
O&MM Operation and Maintenance Manual
PCS Primary Coolant System
PPS Plant Protective System
RAM Remote Area Monitor
RCT Radiation Control Technician
RPSP Reactor Programs Standard Practice
RWP Radiological Work Permit
SORC Safety and Operations Review Committee
SSC Systems, Structures and Components
TIGR Thermally Induced Gallium Removal
TRA Test Reactor Area
TSR Technical Safety Requirements
UFSAR Upgraded Final Safety Analysis Report
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1. SCOPE
The existing Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Experiment has been irradiated in the Advanced Test
Reactor (ATR) under the Fissile Material Disposition Program, Light Water Reactor Mixed
Oxide Fuel Irradiation Test Project.  The original goal was that when any capsule assembly
approaches a burnup of ~30 GWd/MT, the irradiation of all MOX capsule assemblies in the ATR
would be terminated.  In February 2000, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), a lead
laboratory on this Project, decided to continue the irradiation of three lowest burnup assemblies
(with a maximum burnup of 26 GWd/MT) to a burnup of ~30 GWd/MT (not to exceed 30
GWd/MT) (Cowell 2000).  This phase of the experiment includes moving the capsule assemblies
to appropriate locations within the test assembly to achieve desired burnup and is referred to as
the ‘Burnup Equalization Phase’.  The purpose of this ESAP is to demonstrate the safe
irradiation and handling of the MOX Fuel APT experiment as required by ATR Technical Safety
Requirement (TSR) 3.9.1 (ATR 1998).  This ESAP also addresses the specific operation of the
MOX Fuel APT experiment with respect to the operating envelope for irradiation established by
the Upgraded Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ATR 1999).  Experiment handling
activities are discussed herein.
The Fissile Material Disposition Program Light Water Reactor Mixed Oxide Fuel Irradiation
Test Project Plan details a series of irradiation tests designed to investigate the use of weapons-
grade plutonium in MOX fuel for light water reactors (LWR) (Cowell 1996a, Cowell 1997a,
Thoms 1997a).  Commercial MOX fuel has been successfully used in overseas reactors for many
years, however, weapons-derived test fuel contains small amounts of gallium (about 1 to 3 parts
per million) (Morris 2000).  A concern exists that the gallium may migrate out of the fuel and
into the clad, inducing embrittlement.  For preliminary out-of-pile experiments, Wilson (1997)
states that intermetallic compound formation is the principal interaction mechanism between
zircaloy cladding and gallium.  This interaction is very limited by the low mass of gallium, so
problems are not expected with the zircaloy cladding, but an in-pile experiment is needed to
confirm the out-of-pile experiments.  Ryskamp (1998) provides an overview of this experiment
and its documentation.
To provide assurance that the weapons grade MOX fuel will not cause problems to commercial
reactors, a set of MOX fuel capsules will be irradiated in the ATR to burnups of approximately 8
to 30 GWd/MT.  The ATR is located at the Idaho National Engineering & Environmental
Laboratory (INEEL).  The guiding document is Wachs (1997).
The following nomenclature will be used throughout this document and is consistent with that
adopted by the project.
Fuel pellet - individual pieces of ceramic MOX fuel composed of 95% UO2 and 5% PuO2 (with
characteristics very similar to commercial UO2 fuel).  See Chidester (1998) for the best estimates
of plutonium/uranium masses and isotopics.
Fuel pin assembly - Zircaloy-4 tube with welded end caps containing a stack of 15 fuel pellets
and a spring.
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Capsule assembly - stainless steel tube with welded end caps containing a fuel pin assembly (See
Figure 1).
Basket assembly (Model-1) - aluminum insert with attached Inconel neutron shield for the ATR
I-hole.
Basket assembly (Model-2) – all aluminum insert assembly for the ATR I-hole (Pedersen 1998a).
Test assembly - basket assembly with up to nine MOX capsule assemblies (a total of about 35 g
Pu) and flux wires (See Figures 2 and 3).
The gaps in the fuel pin and capsule assemblies are filled with helium gas at 1 atm.
As the first phase of the project, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) sent 13 fuel pin
assemblies to the INEEL Test Reactor Area (TRA) Hot Cell Facility1 (HCF).  Each of the 13 fuel
pin assemblies was seal welded in a 304L stainless steel ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section III outer tube.  Each weld was radiographed in the Radiography facility (TRA-635) also
located at the TRA.  A test assembly containing nine of these 13 capsule assemblies was inserted
in a small I-hole in the ATR reflector.  After the capsule assembly with highest burnup has
achieved the targeted burnup of 8 GWd/MT, two capsule assemblies will be removed from the
test assembly.  The remaining seven irradiated capsule assemblies, along with two unirradiated
capsule assemblies, will be reconfigured in the test assembly.2  The reconfigured test assembly
will then be irradiated until the capsule assembly with highest burnup has achieved the targeted
burnup of 20 GWd/MT.  Two capsule assemblies will then be removed from the test assembly. 
The remaining seven irradiated capsule assemblies, along with two dummy capsule assemblies,
will be reconfigured in the test assembly.  The reconfigured test assembly will then be irradiated
until the highest burnup capsule assembly has achieved the total targeted burnup of 30 GWd/MT.
In the equalization of burnup phase, four capsule assemblies with the highest burnup will be
removed from the test assembly.  Two of these capsule assemblies with the highest burnup will
be shipped to ORNL, while two capsule assemblies will be stored in the ATR canal.  The
remaining three irradiated capsule assemblies, along with six dummy capsule assemblies, will be
reconfigured in the test assembly using the same basket assembly.  The reconfigured test
assembly will then be irradiated until any capsule assembly approaches a total targeted burnup of
approximately 30 GWd/MT (not to exceed 30 GWd/MT). The capsule assemblies and the basket
assembly will be stored in the ATR canal until the decision is made to irradiate further, or to
return all the capsule assemblies and associated hardware to ORNL.3
                                          
1 International Isotopes of Idaho Incorporated, formally known as Mac Isotopes LLC., has the responsibility of operating the Hot Cell Facility.  
2        In Phase II and Phase III, the reconfigured test assembly is expected to use the Model-2 basket.  The Model-1 basket assembly used in Phase I
could be used again if requested by the customer.  Neutronic analyses for both models have been performed by Chang (1998b), and both are
found to be satisfactory.
3 The decision to extend the burnup of the MOX capsule assemblies will be made after the PIE data of the previously irradiated capsule
assemblies (@30 GWd/MT burnup) have been evaluated and analyzed for a potential deformation due to pellet swelling and thermal
expansion as a result of extended burnup.  It is expected that the PIE data and additional analysis will be available by the end of July 2000.  If
the decision is made to extend the burnup, Phase IV of the MOX experiment, a new ESAP will be issued
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Thirteen fuel pin assemblies were received in December 1997.  (The project actually started with
preliminary/design work in 10/96.)  Eleven capsule assemblies are to be irradiated at near-
prototypic, average commercial LWR linear heat generation rates (LHGR) of 6 to 10 kW/ft to
burnup levels of approximately 8 to 30 GWd/MT.  Once the capsule assemblies have cooled
enough to be shipped, they will be sent to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for post-
irradiation examination. 
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Figure 1.  Cross sectional view of fully assembled MOX capsule
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Figure 2.  MOX test assembly side view
C97 1106
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Figure 3.  MOX test assembly top view
“Y” flux holder position “R” capsule position
“X” flux holder position
“L” capsule position
B
L
R
= Back
= Left front
= Right front as
viewed from ATR
core centerline
C98 0057
V-notch
To ATR core
centerline
“B” capsule position
“Z” flux holder position
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2. CAPSULE ASSEMBLY IDENTIFICATION AND LOADING PATTERN
The capsule assemblies to be used for this project are numbered 1-13, as shown in Table 1.  The
capsule assemblies are uniquely marked with identification marks drilled into the top end cap
that are readable under water, as shown in Figure 2. (Cowell 1997b).  The first seven capsule
assemblies contain MOX fuel fabricated from plutonium that has not been treated for gallium
removal.  The remaining six capsule assemblies contain MOX fuel fabricated from plutonium
that has been thermally treated (via the Thermally Induced Gallium Removal (TIGR) process
under development at LANL) for gallium removal.
The experiment consists of three irradiation phases as shown in Figure 4 (Cowell 1997c).  Eleven
capsule assemblies are to be irradiated.  Nine capsules were loaded in the initial insertion in
Phase I.  In Phase II, two spare capsule assemblies were loaded after the first withdrawal of two
capsule assemblies.
In Phase III, Part 1, two dummy capsule assemblies (solid 304L stainless steel) were loaded after
the withdrawal of another two MOX capsule assemblies.  The loading pattern is designed to
expose pairs of capsule assemblies, one from each fuel type, to similar irradiation conditions
throughout all three irradiation phases by taking advantage of axial and radial symmetry to the
extent possible.  In Phase III, Part 2 (also referred to as Burnup Equalization Phase), the four
capsule assemblies with the highest burnup will be removed from the test assembly.  Two
capsule assemblies with the highest burnup will be returned to ORNL and the remaining two
capsule assemblies will be stored in the ATR canal.  The remaining three irradiated capsule
assemblies, along with six dummy capsule assemblies (four new dummy capsule assemblies and
two irradiated dummy capsule assemblies), will be reconfigured in the test assembly.  The
loading pattern is designed to approach equal burnups of these three assemblies while remaining
under 30 GWd/MT.  The reconfigured test assembly will then be irradiated until any capsule
assembly approaches a total targeted burnup of approximately 30 GWd/MT.  The capsule
assemblies and the basket assembly will be stored in the ATR canal until the decision is made to
further irradiate or to return all the capsule assemblies and associated hardware to ORNL.4
The basket assembly is designed with an anti-rotation locating device that will ensure placement
of the basket assembly in the I-hole such that two of the three fuel channels are located
equidistant from the core axial centerline (left and right), with the third channel located slightly
farther away (back).  As viewed from the core centerline, these three fuel channels will hereafter
be referred to individually as left, right, and back (L, R, and B are shown on Figure 3).  Three
individual capsule assemblies will be stacked in each of the three channels.  These locations are
herein designated as the top, middle, and bottom positions.
Because Capsules 1-7 are all type A fuel, they can be placed in any assembly position that
requires type A fuel.  Likewise, capsules 8-13 can be placed in any assembly position that
requires type B fuel.
                                          
4   In the case of extended burnup beyond 30 GWd/MT, a new ESAP document will be issued.
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Table 1.  Fuel pin assembly to capsule assembly cross-reference.
Capsule Assembly
Number
Fuel Assembly
Number Fuel Batch
Gallium Treatment
1 2 A None
2 5 A None
3 6 A None
4 7 A None
5 8 A None
6 9 A None
7 10 A None
8 11 B Thermal (TIGR)
9 12 B Thermal (TIGR)
10 13 B Thermal (TIGR)
11 14 B Thermal (TIGR)
12 15 B Thermal (TIGR)
13 16 B Thermal (TIGR)
Irradiation Phase I extends from the initial insertion until the capsule assembly with highest
burnup reaches an average burnup of 8 GWd/MT.  The loading pattern used for Phase I is shown
in Figure 5 (Cowell 1997c). 
Irradiation Phase II extends until the capsule assembly with highest burnup reaches an average
burnup of 20 GWd/MT.  A suggested loading pattern to be used for Phase II is shown in Figure 6
(Cowell 1997c). The ORNL project management will select the actual loading pattern. From the
ATR safety standpoint, all capsules are identical and can be placed in any position.
Irradiation Phase III, Part 1 extends from the end of Phase II until the capsule assembly with
highest burnup reaches 30 GWd/MT.  A suggested loading pattern to be used in Phase III, Part 1
is shown in Figure 7 (Cowell 1997c).  The loading pattern to be utilized for Phase III, Part 1 of
the irradiation leaves the two highest-flux positions (middle left and middle right) filled with
dummy capsule assemblies rather than MOX-bearing capsule assemblies.  This placement is
expected to increase the power production in the capsule assembly located in the middle, back
position (i.e., Capsule Assembly 5), but it will have negligible impact on the remainder of the
capsule assemblies. 
Irradiation Phase III, Part 2 extends from the end of Phase III, Part 1, until any capsule assembly
approaches a total targeted burnup of  ~30 GWd/MT.  A suggested loading pattern to be used in
Phase III, Part 2 is shown in Figure 7a (Cowell 2000).  This loading pattern leaves the highest-
flux positions (middle left, right, and back ) filled with three capsule assemblies.  The remaining
six positions (top and bottom positions in all three locations) will be filled with dummy capsule
assemblies.  This placement is expected to approach equal burnups of these irradiated capsule
assemblies.
Externally, the dummy capsule assemblies will be identical to the fueled assemblies, such that
hydraulic flow conditions in the test assembly are not significantly affected.  Each dummy
capsule assembly will be a solid piece of stainless steel 304L.
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Figure 4.  Three phases of MOX fuel irradiation project
Irradiate 9 capsule assemblies
until highest burnup capsule
reaches ~8 GWd/MT.
Suggested
Capsule Assembly IDs:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10,13
Irradiate 9 capsule assemblies
until highest burnup capsule
reaches ~20 GWd/MT.
Suggested
Capsule Assembly IDs:
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13 Irradiate 7 capsule assemblies
+ 2 dummy assemblies until
highest burnup capsule
reaches ~30 GWd/MT.
Suggested
Capsule Assembly IDs:
3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13
Transfer capsule assemblies
number 2 and 9 to canal
for storage until ready to
be shipped to ORNL.
Transfer the capsule
assemblies number 3, 4, 10, 13
to canal for storage.  Ship
capsule assemblies number 3
and 10 to ORNL when
ready to be shipped.
Transfer capsule assemblies
numbers 1 and 8 to canal
for storage until ready to
be shipped to ORNL.
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III, Part 1
Gc00 0090 1
Irradiate 3 capsule assemblies
+ 6 dummy assemblies until
highest burnup capsule
reaches ~30 GWd/MT.
Suggested
Capsule Assembly IDs:
5, 6, and 12
Transfer the test assembly to
canal. Disassemble the test
assembly in the canal.
Store the capsule and dummy
assemblies and other hardware
in the canal storage area.
Phase III, Part 2
Prepare the test assembly for
the extended burnup Phase IV.
New ESAP will be issued.
Ship the remaining capsule
assemblies, dummy capsule
assemblies,and basket
assemblies to ORNL when
ready to be shipped.  Discard
remaining waste appropriately.
or
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N = Capsule Assembly Identification Number
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Figure 5.  Suggested initial capsule assembly loading pattern, Phase 1.
Figure 6.  Suggested capsule assembly loading pattern, Phase II irradiation.
 N = Capsule Assembly Identification Number
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Figure 7.  Suggested capsule assembly loading pattern for Phase III, Part 1
irradiation.
10
4
*
6
5
12
3
*
13
Top
Middle
Bottom
Left Right
Back
N

= Capsule Assembly Identification Number
= Dummy Capsule Assembly
Figure 7a.  Suggested capsule assembly loading pattern for Phase III, Part 2
irradiation.
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3.   HAZARD CLASSIFICATION
The ATR and its activities have been classified as Hazard Category 1 per DOE Order 5480.23
(DOE 1992a).  The introduction of the MOX fuel experiments into ATR does not change the
hazard classification.
Two unirradiated MOX fuel capsule assemblies (#6 and #12) will be transported from the TRA
Plug Storage Area North to the ATR Canal in a DOT Type B fissile material transport package
consisting of a 10 gallon DOT Specification 6M drum, with DOT Specification 2R inner
containment vessel.  Transport will be in compliance with RPSP 10.6.4.6, "TRA Unirradiated
Fissile Material Control."  The two MOX fuel capsule assemblies contain a total of
approximately 7.2 g of accountable plutonium (Pu-239/241), approximately 0.4 g accountable
uranium (U-235), and approximately 0.4 g of non-accountable plutonium (Pu-240).  DOE-STD-
1027-92 (DOE 1992b) allows materials in DOT Type B shipping containers to be excluded from
a facility's radioactive inventory.  Therefore, credit can be taken for the DOT Type B shipping
container when considering the hazard classification associated with the transport.  Transporting
the two unirradiated MOX fuel capsule assemblies would constitute a Hazard Category 3 activity
if no credit was applied for shipment in the DOT Type B shipping container (Khericha 1998).
Unirradiated dummy capsule assemblies will be received in the canal area.  The unirradiated
dummy capsule assemblies will be transported by routine methods since they are not large,
heavy, radioactive, or hazardous.
The Hazard Category for the transfer of two irradiated MOX capsule assemblies in Hot Cell
Carrier (HCC) #3 has been determined to be Hazard Category 3 (Pedersen 1998b).  Reference
approves the HCC #3 for Category 3 transport. Hazards associated with MOX experiment
materials shipped in the GE-100 and GE-2000 casks are maintained within the qualifications of
these DOT/NRC approved shipping containers.  Preliminary hazard identifications and
classifications of these types of shipments are addressed in Sections 5.2 of Reference NFAC-
OSB 1996.
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4.  PROCESS DESCRIPTION
4.1. Process Flowchart
Figure 8 shows the “cradle-to-grave” process flowchart for the MOX APT.  For this experiment,
“cradle-to-grave” includes the experiment transfer from the Hot Cell Facility at the TRA until all
the capsules leave the TRA main gate.
This ESAP is prepared on the basis that initial irradiation will take place in the ATR reflector
location small I-24 hole in order to achieve programmatic desired LHGR’s in the range of 6-10
kW/ft.  The safety analysis allows operation up to 12 kW/ft.  A physics calculation will be
performed before the start of every cycle to determine if the LHGR in each capsule assembly
meets the programmatic and safety objectives (Chang 1998a, 1998b).  The explanation of the
steps and associated governing documents, where applicable, are detailed in Section 4.2.
4.2. Descriptions
Steps A through XA were executed in Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III, Part 1. Steps E through I
were executed in Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III, Part 1 but will be repeated as necessary and are
listed for completeness.
Step E Irradiate the test assembly
The test assembly will be irradiated for a cycle in the reactor.
Step F Transfer the test assembly to the ATR Canal after a cycle
The test assembly will be removed from the I-24 reactor core position, inserted into a
transfer bucket and transferred to the canal per DOP 7.2.17.
Step G Replace the test assembly flux monitors
Remove the flux wires from the test assembly in the canal and place the flux wires in the
canal MOX flux wire storage bucket.  The RML Laboratory personnel will count flux
wires in the ATR canal.  Specifically designed tools for the MOX experiment will be
used.  After the counting, the flux wires will be put in the canal waste stream.
Install new flux wires in the basket assembly using tools specifically designed for it, in
accordance with current methodology and using existing procedures.
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Figure 8.  Process flowchart for the experiment
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Receive the MOX fuel
and a basket assembly
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Insert the test assembly
in the reactor.
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GC00 0090 3
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Step H Insert the test assembly in the reactor
The experiment assembly will be transferred to the reactor under existing O&MM's and
inserted in the reactor location I-24 hole by DOP 7.2.17. 
Step I Repeat the steps E through H as necessary
Steps E through H will be repeated as necessary until such time as neutronic burnup
calculations have been shown to satisfy MOX programmatic requirements and no longer
need the flux wire measurements.
Step J Irradiate the test assembly
The test assembly will be irradiated in the reactor.  The test assembly will remain in the
reactor position until the highest burnup capsule assembly has reached desired burnup of
 8 GWd/MT. Preliminary depletion calculations indicate that  7 to 9 calendar months of
irradiation will be required to achieve an average burnup of 8 GWd/MT in the highest
burnup capsule assembly (Cowell 1997a).
Step K Transfer the test assembly to the ATR Canal
The test assembly will be removed from the I-24 core position, inserted into a transfer
bucket and then transferred to the canal per DOP 7.2.17.
Step L Disassemble the test assembly on the working tray in the canal
The test assembly will be disassembled in the canal using tools specifically designed for
the disassembly/re-assembly. All nine capsule assemblies will be removed and placed in
a specifically designed MOX capsule carrier.
Step M Transfer two unirradiated capsule assemblies from the TRA Plug Storage Area
North to the ATR Canal
Two unirradiated MOX fuel capsule assemblies (#6 and #12) will be transported from
the TRA Plug Storage Area North to the ATR Canal in an approved intra-TRA transport
container -- DOT-authorized Type B fissile material transport package consisting of a 10
gallon DOT Specification 6M drum, with DOT Specification 2R inner containment
vessel. Transport will be in compliance with RPSP 10.6.4.6, "TRA Unirradiated Fissile
Material Control."
The two MOX fuel capsule assemblies contain a total of approximately 7.2 g of
accountable plutonium (Pu-239/241), approximately 0.4 g accountable Uranium (U-
235), and approximately 0.4 g of non-accountable plutonium (Pu-240).
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Step N Assemble the test assembly on the working tray in the canal
Nine capsule assemblies, seven irradiated and two unirradiated (#6 and #12), will be
loaded in the basket assembly Model-2, per the loading pattern shown in Figure 6, on the
working tray in the canal per Canal O&MM and Canal Loading Record.  (Insert the new
flux wires as necessary per Step G.) The basket assembly Model-1 will be stored in the
canal and will be shipped to ORNL with the Model-2 assembly at a later date, if required.
Step O Insert the experiment assembly in the reactor
The experiment assembly will be loaded in the reactor I-24 hole location per DOP 7.2.17.
Step P Store and load two irradiated capsule assemblies in the canal.
Two irradiated capsule assemblies (#1 and #8) will be stored in the specifically designed
and approved MOX capsule carrier in the canal storage area in accordance with existing
ATR Canal Storage methodology and procedures.  These capsule assemblies will be
loaded, at least thirty days after the end of cycle (EOC) as schedule permits, in the Hot
Cell Carrier (HCC) #3 cask at the ATR canal per DOPs 4.8.7, and 4.8.46.
Step PA Transport two irradiated capsule assemblies to the TRA Hot Cell Facility.
Two irradiated capsule assemblies (#1 and #8) will be transported to the TRA HCF per
DOP 4.8.19
Step PB Package two irradiated capsule assemblies and transport to ORNL.
Two irradiated capsule assemblies (#1 and #8) will be transferred from the HCC #3 cask
into the GE-100 cask at the TRA HCF in accordance with HCF procedures that reflect the
facilities operating requirements and cask Certificate of Compliance requirements.  The
loaded cask will be transported to ORNL per applicable DOT and NRC requirements.
Step Q Irradiate the test assembly
The test assembly will be irradiated in the reactor.  The test assembly will remain in the
reactor position until the highest-burnup capsule assembly has reached desired burnup of
~20 GWd/MT.  Preliminary depletion calculations indicate that ~14 calendar months of
irradiation in Phase II will be required to achieve an average burnup of 20 GWd/MT in
the highest burnup capsule assembly  (Cowell 1997a).  (Repeat the steps E through H as
necessary for flux wire changeout.)
Step R Transfer the test assembly to the ATR Canal
The test assembly will be removed from the reactor and transferred to the canal per DOP
7.2.17.
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Step S Disassemble the test assembly on the working tray in the canal
The test assembly will be disassembled on the working tray in the canal using tools
specifically designed for the disassembly/re-assembly. All nine capsule assemblies will be
removed and placed in a specifically designed MOX capsule carrier.
Step T Receive two dummy capsule assemblies in the canal area
Two dummy assemblies will be received in the canal area.  The dummy assemblies will
be transported by routine methods since they are not large, heavy, radioactive, or
hazardous.
Step U Assemble the test assembly on the working tray in the canal
Nine capsule assemblies, seven irradiated and two dummy capsule assemblies, will be
loaded in the basket assembly, per the loading pattern shown in Figure 7, on the working
tray in the canal per Canal O&MM and Canal Loading Record.
Step V Insert the reconfigured experiment assembly in the reactor
The experiment assembly will be loaded in the reactor location I-24 hole per DOP 7.2.17.
Step W Irradiate the test assembly
The test assembly will be irradiated in the reactor.  The test assembly will remain in the
reactor position until the lead capsule assembly has reached desired burnup of 30
GWd/MT.  Preliminary depletion calculations indicate that 12 calendar months of
irradiation in Phase III will be required to achieve an average burnup of 30 GWd/MT in
the highest burnup assembly  (Cowell 1997a).  (Repeat steps E through H as necessary for
flux wire changeout.)
Step X Store and load two irradiated capsule assemblies in the canal.
Two irradiated capsule assemblies (#2 and #9) will be stored in the specifically designed
and approved MOX capsule carrier in the canal storage area in accordance with existing
ATR Canal Storage methodology and procedures.  The capsule assemblies will be loaded,
at least thirty days after EOC as schedule permits, into the GE-100 cask at the ATR Canal
in accordance with ATR Canal procedures that reflect the facilities operating
requirements and cask Certificate of Compliance requirements.
Step XA Transport two irradiated capsule assemblies to ORNL.
Two irradiated capsule assemblies in GE-100 cask will be transported to ORNL per
applicable DOE, DOT, and NRC requirements.
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Step Y Transfer the test assembly to the ATR Canal
The test assembly will be removed from the reactor and transferred to the canal per DOP
7.2.17.
Step Z Disassemble the test assembly on the working tray in the canal
The test assembly will be disassembled on the working tray in the canal per O&MM
7.10.13.1.3, section 4.2, capsule and Experiment Handling and the Canal Loading
Record. 
Step YA Store four irradiated capsule assemblies in the canal and later load two capsule
assemblies into GE-100 cask.
Four irradiated capsule assemblies (#3, 4, 10 and 13) will be stored in the specifically
designed and approved MOX capsule carrier in the canal storage area in accordance with
existing ATR Canal Storage methodology and procedures.  Two capsule assemblies (#3
and 10) will be loaded, at least thirty days after EOC as schedule permits, into the GE-100
cask at the ATR Canal in accordance with ATR Canal procedures that reflect the
facility’s operating requirements and cask Certificate of Compliance requirements.
OR
The capsule assemblies will be loaded at least thirty days after EOC as schedule permits,
in the HCC #3 cask at the ATR canal per DOPs 4.8.7, and 4.8.46 to transport to HCF.
The irradiated capsule assemblies will be transported to the TRA HCF per DOP 4.8.19.
Step YB Transport two irradiated capsule assemblies to ORNL.
Two irradiated capsule assemblies in a GE-100 cask will be transported to ORNL per
applicable DOE, DOT, and NRC requirements.
Step YC Receive four unirradiated dummy capsule assemblies in the canal area
Four dummy capsule assemblies will be received in the canal area.  The dummy
assemblies will be transported by routine methods since they are not large, heavy,
radioactive, or hazardous.
Step YD Assemble the test assembly on the working tray in the canal
Nine capsule assemblies, three irradiated (#5, 6, and 12) and six dummy capsule
assemblies, will be loaded in the basket assembly, per the loading pattern shown in Figure
7a, on the working tray in the canal per O&MM 7.10.13.1.3, section 4.2, capsule and
Experiment Handling and the Canal Loading Record. 
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Step YE Insert the reconfigured experiment assembly in the reactor
The experiment assembly will be loaded in the reactor location I-24 hole per DOP 7.2.17.
Step YF Irradiate the test assembly
The test assembly will be irradiated in the reactor.  The test assembly will remain in the
reactor position until the lead capsule assembly has reached desired burnup of
approximately 30 GWd/MT.  Preliminary depletion calculations indicate that six calendar
months of irradiation in Phase III, Part 2 will be required to achieve an average burnup of
30 GWd/MT in the highest burnup assembly  (Chang 2000).  (Repeat steps E through H
as necessary for flux wire change out.)
Step YG Transfer the test assembly to the ATR Canal
The test assembly will be removed from the reactor and transferred to the canal per DOP
7.2.17.
Step YH Disassemble the test assembly on the working tray in the canal
The test assembly will be disassembled on the working tray in the canal per O&MM
7.10.13.1.3, section 4.2, capsule and Experiment Handling and the Canal Loading
Record.  Three capsule assemblies and six dummy assemblies will be removed and
placed in the specifically designed and approved MOX capsule carrier in the canal storage
area.
The following steps will be executed only if it is decided not to extend the burnup of
MOX capsule assemblies; otherwise a new ESAP will be issued. 
Step AA Store the capsule assemblies and dummy assemblies in the canal
Five capsule assemblies and six dummy capsule assemblies will be stored in the
specifically designed and approved MOX capsule carrier in the canal storage area in
accordance with existing ATR Canal Storage methodology and procedures.  The empty
basket assembly will also be stored in the canal storage area. The capsule assemblies will
be stored at least thirty days after EOC before shipping to the ORNL or the HCF.
Step AB Load the irradiated capsule assemblies and basket assemblies in the canal for
shipment to the ORNL.
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The capsule assemblies will be loaded, at least thirty days after EOC as schedule permits,
into the GE-100 cask at the ATR Canal in accordance with ATR Canal procedures that
reflect the facilities operating requirements and cask Certificate of Compliance
requirements.  The loaded cask will be transported to ORNL per applicable DOT and
NRC requirements.
If desired, the empty basket assemblies will be loaded into the GE-2000 cask per DOP
4.8.4 and shipped to the ORNL via commercial carrier.  The loaded cask will be
transported to ORNL per applicable DOE, DOT, and NRC requirements.
Step ZA Load the irradiated capsule assemblies in the canal to ship to the HCF.
The capsule assemblies (#3 and 10) will be loaded, at least thirty days after EOC as
schedule permits, in the HCC #3 cask at the ATR canal per DOPs 4.8.7, and 4.8.46 to
transport to HCF.
If desired, the empty basket will be loaded into the GE-2000 cask per DOP 4.8.4 and
shipped to the ORNL via commercial carrier.  The loaded cask will be transported to
ORNL per applicable DOE, DOT, and NRC requirements.
Step ZB Transport the irradiated capsule assemblies to the TRA HCF.
The irradiated capsule assemblies will be transported to the TRA HCF per DOP 4.8.19.
Step ZC Package the irradiated capsule assemblies and transport to ORNL.
The irradiated capsule assemblies will be loaded into the GE-100 cask at the TRA HCF in
accordance with HCF procedure that reflect the facilities operating requirements and cask
Certificates of Compliance requirement.  The loaded cask will be transported to ORNL
per applicable DOT and NRC requirements.
The waste generated during operation associated with this experiment is the generation of routine
solid contaminated waste such as Anti-Cs, blotter paper, etc. and liquid waste from the cask
vacuum drying process (canal water).  These wastes are disposed with other contaminated waste
generated during operation of the ATR.  All wastes are required to have a hazardous waste
determination to show if the wastes are regulated under the Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act or other applicable federal regulations.  This determination is performed by the
generator and is then approved for inclusion in waste streams for recycling and disposal of solid
wastes.  Any new wastes that are generated from the irradiation or Hot Cell processing activities
must have an approved hazardous waste determination prior to disposal of the waste to ensure
the waste is placed in the appropriate waste streams.
It is a written Commitment of this project made by Dr. S. A. Hodge, Manager, MOX Irradiation
Test Project of ORNL, that all of the irradiated capsules and other hardware items associated
with this test (except the flux wires) will be transported to ORNL, where post-irradiation
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examination (PIE) will be performed as appropriate (Hodge 1997b).  ORNL will prepare a
formal plan to describe the shipments of the irradiated capsules.  INEEL has the option to dispose
of the empty baskets and related hardware in Idaho if that is more cost effective than shipping the
material to ORNL.
There are no special requirements for facility set points or alarms in any of the above steps.  The
standard requirements for reactor tank and material handling are sufficient.
4.3. Safety Envelopes
Steps E, J, Q, W, and YF Irradiation of fuel in the ATR
Steps F, G, H, K, L, N, O, P, R , S, U, V, X, Y, Z , ZA, AA, AB, YA, YD, YE, YG, YH, YJ
Canal activities
The safety envelope for irradiation of the experiments in the ATR and ATR canal activities is
defined by the ATR Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) (ATR 1998), ATR UFSAR (ATR
1999), and analyses listed below.
Analysis References
Thermal Ott 1997, 1998a,1998b
Ambrosek 1997a, 1997b,
1998a,1998b, 2000
Hodge 1997b, 1997c
Stress Corum 1997, 1998
Morton 1997
Thoms 1997a, 1997b
ORNL performed experiments to validate the use of the FFFAP code for analyzing the thermal-
hydraulics of the MOX irradiation tests (Ott 1998b).  The test flow rates and pressure gradient
data are found to be in good agreement with calculated data and are acceptable (Ambrosek
1998a, 1998b).
The Model-2 basket was checked for vibration damage during flow testing of the Model-2 MOX
test basket assembly (Ott 1998b).   There were no observable changes in sound or feel (vibration)
in the basket assembly (differential pressures ranging from 10 to 90 psid) such as would have
indicated excessive vibration.  Magnetometer readings (a cell placed on outside of assembly at
axial location approximately at centerline of top dummy capsule) were acquired at each data
collection point (10 psid increments); this data also indicates no excessive vibration.  The Model-
2 basket assembly design documents has been reviewed and approved by the design review
committee (Grover 1998a).
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Steps M, PA, XA, ZB, T, and YC Transport of unirradiated or irradiated capsule
assemblies within TRA
The safety envelope for the MOX fuel capsule assemblies (unirradiated and irradiated) transport
within the TRA is established by the applicable Operating Procedures as discussed in Section
4.2, along with the DOT regulations for the 6M drum and the controls associated with the
Certificates of Compliance for the GE-100 cask and GE-2000 cask.
Gentillo (1992) contains an engineering evaluation of the HCC #3 cask.  The internal heatup of
MOX capsule assemblies has been analyzed by Hawkes (1998,1999a,1999b) and found to be
acceptable relative to heat generation limits noted in Sherick (1992).
Steps PB, X, ZA, ZC, AB, and YB Shipping activity (Cask Handling and HCF)
The safety envelope for cask handling within the ATR is established by the ATR TSR 3.5.5,
Cask Handling and Irradiated Fuel Storage (ATR 1998), the ATR UFSAR (ATR 1999), and cask
Certificates of Compliance. The loaded GE-100 and GE-2000 casks will be transported to ORNL
per applicable DOE, DOT and NRC requirements.
The safety envelope for the TRA HCF is defined by the TRA Hot Cell Safety Analysis Report
(SAR) and Technical Safety requirements (TSR).
The GE-100 cask at the TRA HCF will be loaded in accordance with HCF procedures that reflect
the facilities operating requirements and cask Certificate of Compliance requirements.  The
loaded cask will be transported to ORNL per applicable DOE, DOT and NRC requirements.
The internal heatup of MOX capsule assemblies # 3 and 10 in the shipping cask will be analyzed
prior to shipment when the decay heat rates become available and confirmed to meet shipping
cask requirements prior to shipment.  It is expected that the results will be bounded by the
previous analysis, Hawkes (1998, 1999a, 1999b).
MOX FUEL IRRADIATION ESAP
DAR No.: MOX-ESAP-3 May 2000
23
5. DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE
This section shows compliance with the ATR TSR/UFSAR requirements that are to be met.
Table 2 shows compliance with the safety envelope.
Table 2.  Demonstration of Compliance
ALL EXPERIMENTS
Requirement Compliance
TSR 3.5.5  Cask Handling and Irradiated Fuel Element Storage
Cask Handling and Irradiated fuel element storage shall be per
Table 3.5.5-1
Cask handling at TRA is performed using Detailed Operating
Procedures (DOP).  These DOPs ensure compliance with all
requirements: 2.1.19, 31.10, 4.8.4, 4.8.7, 4.8.19, and 4.8.46.  Note:
DOP 4.8.4 applies to the GE 2000 cask and DOP 4.8.36 applies to
the GE 100 cask.  These DOPs include information that
demonstrates acceptable cask weights.
TSR 3.9.1  Experiment Safety Margin
An experiment safety assurance package (ESAP) shall
demonstrate compliance to the ATR plant protective criteria for
condition 1, 2, 3, and 4 faults.
Addressed in Section 6, of this ESAP.
TSR 4.9.1.1  Surveillance Requirement
Verify reactor performance calculation prior to reactor operation
after core changes and prior to planned operation changes not
within the existing reactor performance calculation.
The current Core Safety Analysis Package (CSAP) demonstrates
compliance with ‘plant response to reactivity additions’ requirement.
TSR 4.9.1.3  Surveillance Requirements
Verify ESAP prior to experiment insertion into the reactor vessel
and prior to scheduled startup for experiments in the reactor
vessel, or prior to experiment or irradiation test material insertion
in the canal.
DOPs 7.2.17, 7.2.1, 4.8.4, 4.8.7 and 4.8.46, ensure compliance with
all requirements.
TSR 5.7.7  Nuclear Criticality Safety
TSR 5.7.7.2 Fuel storage and handling shall meet the following
requirements:
a.  Allowable fissile material forms in the ATR facility shall
be limited to:
3. Miscellaneous fissile material specimen containing
equivalent of ≤ 365 grams of U235 (e.g. capsule
EXPERIMENTS, flux monitors and sources).
All irradiated experiment movements are controlled by DOPs and
O&MMs that specify all handling limits and requirements (DOP
7.8.25, O&MM 7.10.13.1.2, 7.10.13.1.3, and 7.10.13.1.4) .  The test
assembly contains less than  36g of Pu (equivalent to 72g U235 ) plus
2g of U235.  Thus, with the equivalent of less than 74g of U235, the
MOX test assembly meets the requirement.  During canal handling
operations, 2 more capsules will be involved, thus resulting in a U-
235 equivalent mass of no greater than 90 g which also meets the
requirement.
TSR 5.7.7.2 Continued
b.  Fissile material shall be stored in APPROVED FUEL
STORAGE that is subject to the following limits:
1. keff shall not exceed 0.95 for the service condition.
2. Cooling shall be adequate to remove decay heat without
reaching saturation temperature in the coolant.
3. Storage shall be stable and not susceptible to tipping
from credible natural phenomena or work activities.
4. Relocation of storage units shall be completed only
when fissile materials have been removed from the unit
(Carriers for transporting the material forms and
shipping containers for unirradiated fissile material
forms that are APPROVED FUEL STORAGE are
exempt from this limit.)
5. Storage shall be located away from areas where heavy
loads are routinely handled (e.g., crane assisted
activities) or specific limitations shall be established to
preclude physical contact between heavy loads and
materials in storage.
APPLICABILITY
The MOX experiment, as assembled for irradiation in the ATR, is
composed of 9 MOX capsules.  Each capsule includes less than 4 g
of weapons grade Pu and 0.2 g of U-235.  During ATR canal
activities with the MOX experiment, 2 additional MOX capsules will
be involved.  Therefore, the maximum U-235 equivalent mass,
enveloping all MOX experiment activities in the ATR facility, is
represented by 11 capsules, i.e., 90 g  (ATR TSR conservatively
considers 2 g of U-235 equivalent to 1 g of Pu).  This MOX
experiment U-235 equivalent mass is considerably below the TSR
limit of 365 g for miscellaneous fissile material specimens.  Under
optimum water moderation and reflection conditions, a homogeneous
U-235 mass of at least approximately 500 g would be required to
produce a k-effective of 0.9 (corresponding minimum mass of Pu-
239 for the same k-effective would be approximately 300 g). 
Therefore, the k-effective for any arrangement of the 11 MOX
capsules in the ATR canal is assured to be less than  0.95 as long as
other fissile material forms are maintained at the TSR required
distance of at least one foot from the MOX capsules. Ryskamp
(1997), Boston (1996)
Adequate decay heat cooling is demonstrated in Compliance
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Requirement Compliance
Applies at all times except as specified for fissile material
forms outside of APPROVED FUEL STORAGE (TSR
5.7.7.2(d)).  Miscellaneous fissile material specimens
containing in aggregate the equivalent of <  15 g of U-235
(e.g., EXPERIMENTS, flux monitors and sources) are
excluded from and/or do not to show compliance with
these requirements.
statements for UFSAR 10.4.3 and 10.3.5.2.1 (Grover, 1998b)
The MOX experiment basket, as supported and handled, is stable
and not susceptible to tipping.  The MOX capsule carrier, which will
infrequently store as many as 11 MOX capsules, is also stable and
designed to prevent spilling of capsules if tipped.
The MOX capsule carrier is approved for storage for MOX capsules
and is exempt from this requirement.  The MOX capsule carrier may
be relocated, as necessary, to accommodate MOX capsule
manipulations.
Existing ATR canal procedural controls will assure the MOX
experiment basket or MOX capsule carrier will be stored as required.
All irradiated experiment movements are controlled by DOPs and
O&MMs that specify all handling limits and requirements (DOP
7.8.25, O&MM 7.10.13.1.2, 7.10.13.1.3, and 7.10.13.1.4).
Requirements 1, 2, and 3 of this section are met for two MOX
capsules in HCC #3.
MOX capsules #2 and #9 are to be transferred in HCC #3 to the
TRA Hot cell facility.  These two capsules located in the isotope
transport canister within HCC #3, following at least 30 days decay
after reactor shutdown, meet the requirements for being in approved
fuel storage.  The above Compliance for Item 1 shows that k-eff for
only two MOX capsules is less than 0.95, Hawkes (1999a, 1999b)
shows adequate cooling of MOX capsules #2 and #9 (removed at the
 end of Phase II) in HCC #3, and HCC #3, after  being closed , is not
affected by tipping.
TSR 5.7.7.7.2  Continued
d. Fissile material forms outside of APPROVED FUEL
STORAGE shall be limited to (limits apply to each
independently):
1. Canal
ii. No more than one fueled EXPERIMENT.  Miscellaneous
fissile material specimens containing in an aggregate the
equivalent of < 15 g of U-235 (e.g., EXPERIMENTS, flux
monitors and sources) are excluded from this requirement.
iii. No more than 365 grams of U235 equivalent in miscellaneous
specimen.
iv. No more than one type (FUEL ELEMENT(S), fueled LOOP
FACILITY EXPERIMENT or miscellaneous fissile material
specimens) of fissile material shall be out of approved storage at
any time. Miscellaneous fissile material specimens containing in
an aggregate the equivalent of < 15 g of U-235 (e.g.,
EXPERIMENTS, flux monitors and sources) are excluded from
this requirement.
2. Vessel
ii. No more than one fueled EXPERIMENT outside the core. 
Miscellaneous fissile material specimens containing in an
aggregate the equivalent of < 15 g of U-235 (e.g.,
EXPERIMENTS, flux monitors and sources) are excluded from
this requirement.
iii. No more than 365 grams of U235 equivalent in miscellaneous
specimen.
iv. No more than one type (FUEL ELEMENT(S), fueled
LOOP FACILITY EXPERIMENT or miscellaneous
fissile material specimens) of fissile material shall be
out of approved storage at any time. Miscellaneous
fissile material specimens containing in an aggregate
the equivalent of < 15 g of U-235 (e.g.,
All irradiated experiment movements are controlled by DOPs and
O&MMs that specify all handling limits and requirements (DOP
7.8.25, O&MM 7.10.13.1.2, 7.10.13.1.3, and 7.10.13.1.4).
ii.  The MOX experiment basket and the MOX capsule carrier,
stored on a canal hook, are approved fuel storage for MOX capsules.
iii. The U-235 equivalent mass of 11 MOX capsules is a maximum
of 90 g.
iv. Existing procedural controls will assure no other fissile material
form will be out of approved storage in the canal when MOX
capsule manipulations are performed on the capsule loading tray.
All irradiated experiment movements are controlled by DOPs and
O&MMs that specify all handling limits and requirements (DOP
7.8.25, O&MM 7.10.13.1.2, 7.10.13.1.3, and 7.10.13.1.4).
The MOX experiment in the designated reactor I-hole is considered
approved storage.  Existing procedural controls will assure that no
other fueled experiment in the vessel is outside the core whenever
the MOX experiment is being handled in the vessel.
The MOX experiment basket includes a maximum of 9 MOX
capsules, which represent a U-235 equivalent mass of less than 74 g.
Existing procedural controls will assure that no other fissile material
form will be out of approved storage in the vessel when the MOX
experiment basket is being handled in the vessel.
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Requirement Compliance
EXPERIMENTS, flux monitors and sources) are
excluded from this requirement.
TSR 5.7.7.2 d Continued
3. Other
ii. No more than one fueled EXPERIMENT outside the canal or
the reactor vessel.  Miscellaneous fissile material specimens
containing in an aggregate the equivalent of < 15 g of U-235
(e.g., EXPERIMENTS, flux monitors and sources) are
excluded from this requirement.
iii. No more than 365 grams of U235 equivalent in miscellaneous
specimen outside the canal or the reactor vessel.
iv.  No more than one type (FUEL ELEMENT(S), fueled LOOP
FACILITY EXPERIMENT or miscellaneous fissile material
specimens) of fissile material shall be out of approved storage
at any time. Miscellaneous fissile material specimens
containing in an aggregate the equivalent of < 15 g of U-235
(e.g., EXPERIMENTS, flux monitors and sources) are
excluded from this requirement.
All irradiated experiment movements are controlled by DOPs and
O&MMs that specify all handling limits and requirements (DOP
7.8.25, O&MM 7.10.13.1.2, 7.10.13.1.3, and 7.10.13.1.4).
Existing procedural controls will assure no other fueled experiment is
outside the canal or reactor when the 2 unirradiated MOX capsules
are brought to the canal and also when the MOX capsules are
shipped from the canal. 
The MOX experiment basket includes a maximum of 9 MOX
capsules, which represent a U-235 equivalent mass of less than 74 g.
  The U-235 equivalent mass of 11 MOX capsules (9 in the basket
and the 2 unirradiated capsules) is a maximum of only 90 g.
Existing procedural controls will assure that no other fissile material
form will be out of approved storage when the MOX experiment
basket is being handled.
TSR 5.7.7.2  Continued
e.  In water, a minimum distance of one foot shall be maintained
between any two of the individual items of fissile material forms
outside APPROVED FUEL STORAGE, except for special
circumstances during loading and unloading of FUEL
ELEMENTS from the fuel annulus.  When tolerance or other
interferences do not allow loading or unloading of a single FUEL
ELEMENT from the fuel annulus., a pair may be inserted or
removed provided the SRO in charge of handling has completed a
specific evaluation that establishes limits to preclude interaction
with any other fissile material out of APPROVED STORAGE.  
Miscellaneous fissile material specimens containing in an
aggregate the equivalent of < 15 g of U-235 (e.g.,
EXPERIMENTS, flux monitors and sources) are excluded from
minimum distance requirements.
All irradiated experiment movements are controlled by DOPs and
O&MMs that specify all handling limits and requirements (DOP
7.8.25, O&MM 7.10.13.1.2, 7.10.13.1.3, and 7.10.13.1.4).
MOX experiment capsules constitute one fissile material form and
therefore may be adjacent to one another provided no other fissile
material form is within one foot from any of the MOX capsules.
TSR 5.7.7.2 Continued
f.  All activities requiring movement of fissile materials to be out
of APPROVED FUEL STORAGE shall be completed with at
least two staff members trained in the handling of fissile material.
 In addition, the Shift Supervisor or his designated alternate shall
be present to direct fuel handling when more than two FUEL
ELEMENTS are outside approved storage in the canal including
canal transfer tube.
Activities requiring movement of miscellaneous fissile material
specimens containing in an aggregate the equivalent of < 15 g of
U-235 (e.g., EXPERIMENTS, flux monitors and sources) shall be
completed with at least one staff member trained in handling of
fissile material.
All canal operators dealing with operations involving the MOX
capsules will be trained and certified fissile material handlers.
The two man rule will be invoked by S.D. 11.5.6, and O&MM
7.10.13.1.27.
TSR 5.8.3  Reviews and Audits
A contractor designated, independent review committee shall
review all matters with nuclear safety implications.  The
membership, responsibilities, and procedures of the review
committee shall be formally documented and approved by
contractor management.
The Safety and Operations Review Committee (SORC) reviews all
Experiment Safety Assurance Packages per SP 10.1.1.3.
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UFSAR 4.3.2.2 Power Distribution
Due to nature of ATR operation new experiments are occasionally
inserted into the reactor.  When new experiments are placed into
the reactor , additional  analysis is performed to provide assurance
that the reactor response with new experiments meets the
established safety envelope.
MOX experiment does not require any additional analysis since the
experiment is irradiated in the I-24 position.  Experiments located in
the I-24 position have no significant effect on the ATR axial flux
profile in the reactor fuel
UFSAR 10.1.7.1  Primary Experiment Safety Analyses Criterion
The consequences of normal operation of the experiment and of
any experiment fault must be bounded by the ATR Plant
Protection Criteria for the same operating condition (i.e.,
Condition 1, 2, 3, and 4 as defined in Chapter 15 (Accident
Analyses)).
The primary experiment safety analyses criterion applies
whenever the experiment is within the ATR facility.
Compliance to this requirement is demonstrated in Section 6 and 7 of
this ESAP.  Faw (1998) concluded, based on ORIGEN 2 and RSAC-
5 calculations, that the MOX fuel would contribute less than 0.1% of
the total dose at the LPZ (low population zone) if a postulated large
break resulted in a release of radionuclides from both the ATR fuel
and the MOX fuel.  Based on a postulated confinement leak rate of
100% day, Faw calculated LPZ doses from MOX fuel of only 0.210
rem thyroid and 0.0132 rem EDE.   See Terry (1998b) for the
clarification of table headings in Faw (1998) reference.
UFSAR 10.1.7.2  General Experiment Safety Analyses Criterion
for Experiments Containing Fissile Material
The following general experiment safety analyses criterion must
be met for any experiment containing fissile material:
The experiment fissile material form and content must be
shown to be enveloped by the existing criticality safety
evaluations described in Chapter 9 (Auxiliary Systems) and
the TSR administrative controls for nuclear criticality safety.
This general experiment safety analyses criterion for experiments
containing fissile material applies whenever the experiment is
within the ATR facility.  If this criterion is not met, additional
criticality safety evaluations and appropriate changes to the TSR
administrative controls must be made prior to conducting the
experiment.
At most, there will be eleven MOX capsules in the canal at any one
time.  This would represent less than 90g of U-235 equivalent.  Per
UFSAR 9.1.2.1, “Fissile material units, except ATR elements and
loop experiments, are limited to ≤ 365g U-235 equivalent (plus ≥ 1
foot spacing) so that k-effective need not be considered.”
Experiment manipulations involving the MOX capsules are
addressed by existing procedural controls which will assure the
criticality safety evaluations of Chapter 9 are enveloping.
Administrative controls for nuclear criticality safety are addressed
under TSR 5.7.7, contained in this section.
UFSAR 10.1.7.3.2  Code Compliance of Experiment Containment
Experiment containment that holds pressure greater than 235 psig,
or contains material that can generate pressure pulses greater than
430 psig, must have a design that meets the intent of ASME
Section III, Class 1 standards, or the ability, demonstrated by
prototype testing or other means, to withstand service conditions
without failure.
Each capsule assembly has been designed as a Class 1 vessel and
satisfies the appropriate rules specified in subsection NB, Section III,
Division 1 of the ASME B&PV Code.  Based on the best estimate
analysis, Hodge 1997b, MOX fuel pin gas plenum pressure is
calculated to be 131 psia (for 30,000 MWd/MT), which is less than
235 psig.
UFSAR 10.1.7.3.3  Containment of Materials
Materials which are incompatible with the reactor fuel element
cladding, the reactor primary coolant, canal water coolant, or with
reactor primary coolant system (PCS) structural materials must be
contained to ensure they are not released to the PCS or canal as a
result of a Condition 2 or 3 fault.
Incompatible materials, normally used as activation monitors,
must be secured to minimize the likelihood of being lost in the
reactor PCS.
All the materials associated with the MOX experiment assembly are
compatible with the primary coolant and/or with the PCS structural
materials.  Gallium (about 2 ppm) in the fuel pellets, is inside Zr-
clad, which in turn is encapsulated in a stainless steel pressure vessel
that meets ASME Section III code requirements.  Gallium will not
migrate to the stainless steel capsule.
Standard ATR flux monitor wires will be contained in an aluminum
holder tube and secured in the basket assembly.
UFSAR 10.1.7.3.4  Excluded Materials
The following materials are not permitted in an experiment or
loop facility within the reactor biological shielding.
Unknown Materials - No experiments shall be performed unless
the material content, with the exception of trace constituents, is
known.
Explosive materials with an equivalent of ≥ 25 mg of TNT. 
(Explosive material is a solid or liquid which has an explosion
hazard in water or steam, as defined in Lewis (1990), and is used
Materials contained in this experiment are identified via Wachs 1997
(listing of Drawings is provided in the Reference) of this ESAP.
Chidester 1998 presents the uranium and plutonium loadings. 
Gallium (about 2 ppm) is present in the fuel pellets, which is inside
Zr-clad, which in turn is encapsulated in a stainless steel pressure
vessel that meets ASME Section III code requirements.
This experiment contains no explosive materials.
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in a configuration that can detonate and produce a shock wave.)
Cryogenic liquids
This experiment contains no cryogenic materials.
UFSAR 10.1.7.3.5  Evaluation of Materials
The following materials are not used in experiments unless such
usage is shown to be in compliance with the primary experiment
safety analyses criterion in section 10.1.7, and the compliance
analyses are completed prior to insertion in the reactor vessel or
canal.
Radiologically hazardous activation products.
Radiation sensitive materials.
Highly flammable or toxic materials, per se or as by-products of
radiation sensitive materials.
Reactive Materials which are defined as any solid or liquid which
has a reactivity index of 2 in National Fire Protection Association
Publication 704 (NFPA 1996) or has a disaster or fire hazard
indicating detrimental reactions in water or steam (Lewis 1990).
The containment, irradiation monitoring, shielding and operational
controls are adequate for the material content of this experiment.
Section 7 of this ESAP provides the detailed Safety Analysis for
Radiation exposure and Barrier Protection.
The experiment contains uranium and weapons grade plutonium. 
Peak total activity from the actinides + daughter and other fission
products (MOX fuel) is calculated to be considerably less than the
total activity from the actinides + daughter and other fission products
(ATR fuel) generated during normal ATR fuel cycles (Hodge
1997c).
Wilson (1997) states that intermetallic compound formation is the
principal interaction mechanism between zircaloy and gallium.  This
interaction is very limited by the low mass of gallium (about 2 ppm),
so problems are not expected with the zircaloy cladding.  The
stainless steel will not interact with gallium because no gallium will
migrate through the zircaloy.
UFSAR 10.1.7.3.7  Physical Layout
Components of experiment facilities are located and oriented to
preclude physical interference with personnel evacuation or with
safety-related systems, structures, and components.  If
displacement of system shielding is involved, measures are to be
taken to ensure radiation levels are below the ATR Plant
Protection Criteria for occupational exposure.
The test assembly is inserted in position I-24, thus precluding
physical interference with reactor components.  No displacement of
reactor shielding is involved.
UFSAR 10.1.7.4  Thermal Hydraulic Criteria
The conduct of the experiment must not adversely affect decay
heat transfer from the canal fuel elements or heat transfer from the
PCS.
While in the core this experiment is in an existing irradiation facility
away from the fuel elements.  While in the canal it will be located on
a canal hook, on the capsule loading tray or in a specially fabricated
carrier, away from the fuel storage grids. The conduct of the
experiment will not adversely affect decay heat transfer from the
canal fuel elements or heat transfer from the PCS.
UFSAR 10.1.8.1  Quality Review
The design, fabrication, testing, and material content of all
contractor-supplied experiment hardware are verified in
accordance with the contractor's Quality Program Plan (See
Chapter 17, Quality Assurance).  For experiment hardware
supplied by other organizations, the design, fabrication, testing
and material content are verified in accordance with a Quality
Program that has been reviewed by the contractor and found to
meet the intent of the applicable sections of the contractor Quality
Program Plan or the contractor verifies that the experiment meets
the intent of the applicable sections of the contractor Quality
Program Plan.  These quality reviews are documented in the ESA.
The design, fabrication, testing, and verification of material content
was performed by ORNL and LANL.  The documentation associated
with these activities has been reviewed for compliance with
requirements by INEEL, Ambrosek (1997a, 1998a, and 1998b)
Morton 1997, West (1997a, 1997b).
The fabrication, testing, and material content of the ORNL and
LANL supplied components have been reviewed by Quality (Cooper
1998) and found to be acceptable.  For Model-2 basket assembly see
nonconformance report (NCR 1998), and Hodge (1998a)
UFSAR 10.1.8.2  Supporting Analyses
The contractor is responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of
supporting analyses submitted by the experimenter organizations.
The operation of each experiment facility is compared to the
facility design specification to assure that it is properly enveloped.
 Each experiment is compared to the safety analysis envelope to
assure consistency with the assumptions made in the analyses.
The analyses in support of this experiment were performed by
ORNL, Corum, (1997, 1998), Ott  (1997, 1998a, 1998b), Hodge 
(1997b, 1997c), Thoms (1997a, 1997b) and LANL, Chidester
(1998).
INEEL, Ambrosek (1997a, 1998a, 1998b), Morton (1997), West
(1997a, 1997b) reviewed the analyses for adequacy and accuracy
(including assumptions to the supporting analyses).  Other INEEL
assessments, e.g. Tomberlin (1997) have been performed.
UFSAR 10.1.8.3  Independent Safety Review
Each ESAP has an independent safety review. This ESAP has been presented to and approved by SORC.
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A Contractor-designated, multi-disciplined independent safety
review committee reviews each experiment and the analyses that
is used to verify compliance to this UFSAR and the TSR, and
presents recommendations to the Reactor Programs Director.
The independent safety review committee concurs with
conducting the experiment.
UFSAR 10.4.3  Experiment Handling Evaluations
For fueled experiments, a minimum cooling time after shutdown
will be established to assure that melting of the experiment will
not occur during handling of the experiment. For loop
experiments, a minimum cooling time after shutdown of eight
hours has been established (Hendrickson 1997a).  If necessary, a
short time may be supported by the ESA.
Ambrosek 1997b states that a horizontal MOX capsule on the canal
floor  four hours after ATR shutdown will not boil on the capsule
surface, which precludes any potential for dryout and a temperature
excursion.  The MOX assembly has no reverse flow device to hinder
natural convection.  Natural convection cooling in the MOX
assembly is expected to be better than in an ATR fuel element
because a large portion of the operational pressure drop is across an
orifice.  Therefore, MOX fuel melting will not occur in the canal. 
Restrictions will be placed in the Reactor Loading Record to prohibit
transfer of the test assembly out of the reactor and to the canal in less
than four (4) hours after a reactor scram.
UFSAR 10.4.3 Experiment Handling Evaluations (continued)
The ESA addresses a) handling operations which can include
assembly, disassembly, storage, and cask handling, b) limiting
fault analyses for each handling evolution, and c) effects on the
experiment during a canal draining accident and demonstrates
compliance with the ATR Plant Protection Criteria for all
applicable operating conditions.
The demonstration of compliance with the ATR Plant Protection
Criteria for all applicable operating conditions is addressed in
Section 7, Plant Protection Criteria, of this document.
c) Thermal calculations for an irradiated MOX capsule cooled by
natural convection of ambient air (as would be encountered in a
drained canal) show that a canal draining event beginning four (4)
hours after reactor scram would result in no melting of any fuel or
structural material in the test assembly (Bayless, 1998).
UFSAR 10.4.3  Experiment Handling Evaluations (continued)
Various experiment handling evolutions require the use of
building cranes.  Formal documentation shall be available to show
limits for each crane used.  The document shall indicate load
limits, lift heights, allowable reactor status (e.g., operating,
shutdown, or defueled) and allowable status of canal storage. 
Verification of the required documentation is an element of the
ESA.
DOP 4.8.4, which applies to the GE 2000 Cask, DOP 4.8.36 which
applies to the GE 1OOCask, or DOP 4.8.7 which applies to the HCC
#3 Cask, shall be used when experiment handling requires its use for
the MOX experiment.  These casks have been approved for ATR
and the corresponding DOP references the requirements of this
section of the UFSAR.
CAPSULE EXPERIMENT ONLY
UFSAR 10.1.5 Classification of Experiment Structures, Systems,
and Components (SSC)
Classification of the capsule and canal experiment SSC and the
applicability of General Design Criterion 70 to capsule
experiment SSC are addressed on a case basis in the ESA for the
capsule.
There are no important-to-safety SSC for this capsule experiment
that need to meet General Design Criterion 70.  Experiment fault
consequences are consistent with those of the reactor and its
associated systems.
UFSAR 10.3.5.1.1  Comparison to Safety Analyses  (Reactivity
Insertion Rate)
The potential reactivity insertion rate shall not exceed the
reactivity insertion rate of the limiting event in each fault category
analyzed in the UFSAR without additional analyses to show
acceptable consequences.  Verification of compliance is required
prior to reactor operation.
The potential reactivity insertion from experiment failure is within
the reactivity limits for the fault categories as discussed in Section 6.
UFSAR 10.3.5.1.2  Flux Trap Cascading
Experiments in a reactor flux trap that generate significant heating
and transfer the heat to the associated coolant very rapidly have
the capability of adding additional positive reactivity during a
power transient.  This effect is known as cascading.  Analyses in
Chapter 15 (Accident Analyses) establish a reactivity insertion
envelope for this effect.  The cascading reactivities used in
Chapter 15 were developed from the previous analyses of a 0.75$
step insertion (EG&G 1994b).  The cascade reactivity envelope as
This experiment is not located in a flux trap.
MOX FUEL IRRADIATION ESAP
DAR No.: MOX-ESAP-3 May 2000
29
Requirement Compliance
defined in Chapter 15 is 0.05$ in 0.13 seconds for Condition 2
events, 0.03$ in 0.04 seconds for Condition 3 events and 0.17$ in
0.15 seconds for Condition 4 events.
UFSAR 10.3.5.1.3  Flux Trap Reactivity Feedback
The positive reactivity feedback from the flux traps was
considered significant in the analyses of the PCS flow coast down
event during a loss of commercial power (Chapter 15.3, Decrease
in Reactor Primary Coolant Flow Rate) (Terry 1994).  The
reactivity feedback from the flux traps shall not exceed the values
of the analyses without additional analyses to demonstrate
compliance with the plant protection criteria.  The verification of
the reactivity feedback must be completed prior to reactor
operation.
This experiment is not located in a flux trap.
UFSAR 10.3.5.2.1 Experiments Cooled by Reactor Primary Coolant
During reactor operation in the pressurized mode with reactor
power greater than 3 MW, when reactor primary coolant is used
to cool surfaces of experiments, the following thermal-hydraulic
criteria are used to assure no flow instability occurs during normal
transient conditions:
(i)   The DNB ratio is always greater than two; or the heat flux at
the hottest spot is lower, by at least three standard deviations, than
the DNB heat flux computed for the condition of reactor primary
coolant pumps coast down to emergency flow assuming reactor
power is initially 250 MW and a PPS scram occurs.
(ii)   The rise in bulk reactor primary coolant temperature along
the experiment hot track is less than half the value that would
cause flow instability; or the highest reactor primary coolant
temperature is lower, by at least three standard deviations, than
the value that would cause the flow to become unstable, computed
under the same condition as (i) above.
(iii)  Any perturbation by an experiment of reactor primary
coolant flow in a fuel element shall not cause the protection
criteria of Chapter 15 (Accident Analyses) to be exceeded.
Verification of the thermal hydraulic criteria is required prior to
reactor operation.
The thermal analysis for two pump operation presented in Ott 1997,
results in the following:
DNBR                          Flow Instability Ratio
6.54 (>2.0)                               2.66 (2.0)
Limits are given in parenthesis
These values were calculated for coastdown of the primary system
scenario as a result of loss of commercial power to the site during
two pump operation with NW lobe power at 34 MW, which is the
maximum allowable lobe power for the NW lobe.     
(iii)   No credible mechanisms have been identified by which this
experiment could possibly perturb the coolant flow in a reactor fuel
element.
UFSAR 10.3.5.3  Gas Leakage
During reactor operation, experiments must not leak gas into the
reactor such that the ATR Plant Protection Criteria specified  in
Chapter 15 (Accident Analyses) are exceeded.
Gas release potential from this MOX experiment is limited to the
helium and generated fission product gases.  The peak fission
product gas volume from all nine (9) capsule assemblies is small (1.8
cubic inches), such that if all was released simultaneously, it would
not exceed the consequences of a gas leakage fault as discussed in
UFSAR Section 15.10.4.   In addition, these few cubic inches of
gases would be swept through the PCS and largely dispersed before
potentially entering ATR fuel or flux traps.  Each capsule assembly
has been designed as a Class 1 vessel per the appropriate rules as
specified in subsection NB, Section III, Division 1 of the ASME
B&PV Code.  Therefore, leakage from a capsule is a Condition 3
fault.  Based on the best estimate analysis, Hodge 1997b, fuel pin
gas plenum pressure is calculated to be 131 psia (at 30,000
MWD/MT), which is less than the normal core inlet pressure of
about 360 psig.
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6. SAFETY ANALYSIS
The ESAP is based on irradiation of the MOX experiment in the reactor I-24 hole.  Irradiation in
any other small I-hole will require a revision of this ESAP.  The results of the analyses discussed
in this section are based on the Model-1 basket assembly.  However, the results are also valid for
the Model-2 basket assembly (Ambrosek 1998b).
Steps A through XA were previously completed.
6.1. Assembling of the Test Assembly on the ATR Main Floor
Prior to assembling the test assembly on the ATR main floor, a dry run was performed in the
HCF using the basket assembly and the nine capsule assemblies.  The purpose of this dry run was
to provide training and to determine the timing requirement as well as work out any unforeseen
problem(s).  The capsule assemblies were handled in the presence of qualified nuclear material
handlers.  The ATR main floor is part of the ATR Criticality Control Area (CCA).  The total
amount of fissile material in the nine capsule assemblies is about 35g Pu and 2g U235.  Over 1000
capsule assemblies, fully reflected, would be required in the optimum geometry to achieve
criticality (Ryskamp 1997).  No other fissile material movement was allowed on the ATR main
floor during assembling of the test assembly. 
The following limitations and definitions were also implemented during the experiment assembly
on the ATR main floor: 1) only one MOX capsule at a time would be removed from the 6M
drum and transferred into the basket assembly, 2) the open 6M drum would be considered
approved storage for the MOX capsules as long as the capsule transfer process continues until the
experiment is assembled and all nine capsules have been removed from the drum, and 3) the
basket assembly was considered approved storage for the MOX capsules.  Dropping a capsule
assembly is considered to be an anticipated event.  However, any release is considered to be an
extremely unlikely event because of the double encapsulation, and the consequences are low.  A
large fire during experiment assembly is considered to be an incredible event on the basis of 1
hour stay time on the ATR main floor.  Therefore, assembling of the MOX test assembly on the
ATR main floor does not pose any unusual threat to workers health and safety.
6.2. Irradiation of the experiment in the ATR
Steps E, J, Q, W, and YF Irradiation of the experiment in the ATR
The following Condition 1, 2, 3, and 4 scenarios were analyzed on the basis of nine MOX fuel
capsule assemblies in the test assembly.  Sample analyses for the Model-2 basket with two
pumps operation and 1 fuel capsule assembly (at 12 kW/ft LHGR) between 2 dummy capsule
assemblies per channel (total 3 fuel capsule assemblies per test assembly, See Figure 7a) have
also been performed.  The results indicated that the overall fluid temperature rose 11.1 oF within
the test assembly and the minimum DNBR was 14.75 in the case of only one fuel capsule
assembly per channel compared to a temperature rise of 27 oF and minimum DNBR of 8.06 in
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the case of three fuel capsule assemblies per channel.(Hodge 2000)  The analyses and results
were reviewed by the INEEL and were found to be satisfactory. (Ambrosek 2000).  Therefore,
the Phase III, Part2, experiment is bounded by the previous analyses.
6.2.1. Condition 1 Normal Power Operation in Reactor
Fission Gas Behavior and Swelling Effects
The fission gas inventory is composed of krypton, xenon, iodine, and cesium.  Cs and I originate
as independent entities, but subsequently combine to form gas molecules such as I2  and CsOH,
and compound CsI, also a gas at high temperature.  As these gases accumulate within the fuel
matrix, a portion of the total gas inventory will emerge from the pellet surface and enter the void
spaces within the confines of the surrounding fuel pin assembly.  This escape of the fission gases
from the fuel pellets causes pressurization of the fuel pin assembly.  The escape fraction depends
upon atomic diffusion, gas bubble nucleation, bubble migration, bubble coalescence, interaction
of bubbles with structures, and irradiation resolution.
The highest escape fraction for MOX fuel that has been reported in the available literature for a
LHGR of 12 kW /ft is 21% (30 to 50 GWd/MT).  The best estimate expected escape fraction
available in the literature is 0.8% at 30 GWd/MT for a LHGR of 4.1 kW/ft.  In recognition that
the LHGR under consideration (12 kW/ft) is three times higher (and the desired maximum is 10
kW/ft), the best estimate release rate is set three times higher, at 3%.  Thus, an upper bound for
the expected pressure (fission gas plus helium) in the fuel pin assembly at a burnup of 30
GWd/MT is calculated to be 675 psi (21% release), and the best estimate value of expected
pressure within the hottest fuel pin assembly is calculated to be 114 psi (3% release) (Hodge
1997b).  These calculated pressures are well within the design limit of 1425 psi.
The calculated pellet swelling is expected to close the pellet-to-clad gap at a burnup of 10.6
GWd/MT.  As the burnup continues, the pellet diameter is expected to increase another 1.8 mils,
in the process imposing a hoop strain of 0.5% on the fuel pin wall.  Such a small strain can easily
be accommodated by normal creep relaxation of the Zircaloy wall at operating temperatures of
300 C (Hodge 1997b).
Although the diameter of the fuel pin wall will be slightly expanded by pellet swelling, the outer
surface of the fuel pin will not come into contact with the surrounding stainless steel capsule. 
Thus, fuel pin swelling is not expected to impose any loading to the capsule wall.
Pellet swelling and normal thermal expansion of the fuel is predicted to increase the total fuel
volume by 4.2 %.  However, all of this added fuel volume is expected to be accommodated by
increases in the total fuel pin volume because of the outward expansion of the fuel pin wall and
the increased pin length caused by both thermal expansion and irradiation.  Thus, fuel pellet
swelling is not expected to reduce the volume assumed available for the fission gas that will be
generated during the experiment.  
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Capsule Temperatures
The highest capsule temperatures occur at the fuel radial centerline.  The highest temperatures
are 1771 °C within the top half of the top pellet and 1566 °C within the bottom half of the
bottom pellet at a LHGR of 12 kW/ft during 2-pump operation.  Note that the desired maximum
LHGR is 10 kW/ft, so these analyses are conservative.  The melting temperature for UO2 plus 5
weight percent PuO2 is 2813 °C for fresh fuel and 2653 °C for fuel at 50 GWd/MT burnup.  The
maximum fuel surface temperature is estimated to be less than 600 °C.  The Zr inner surface
temperature is calculated to be ~400 °C and capsule surface temperature is calculated to be
~100 °C.  The predicted axial variations in the capsule temperatures are given in Figure 3.5 of
Ott 1997.  The maximum gas temperature in the fuel pin is calculated to be 1580 °C in the pellet
dish region at a LHGR of 12 kW/ft.  The maximum gas temperature in the capsule assembly is
calculated to be 260 °C in fuel pin-to-capsule annular gap at a LHGR of 12 kW/ft (Hodge 1997b,
Ott 1997).
Coolant Pressure Drop and Temperature Rise
Ott (1997) performed thermal hydraulic analyses for normal operation (two- or three-pump). 
These analyses assumed a linear heat generation rate (LHGR) of 12 kW/ft even though the
capsules are expected to have LHGRs of 6-10 kW/ft during normal operations (Chang 1998a ).
With three pumps in operation, a pressure drop of 87 psid across the ATR core and experimental
test section was calculated.  The overall fluid temperature rise was calculated to be 24 oF within
the test assembly and 4.3 oF in the exterior coolant flow.
With two pumps in operation, a pressure drop of 67 psid across the ATR core and experimental
test section was calculated.  The overall fluid temperature rise was calculated to be 27 oF within
the test assembly and 4.9 oF in the exterior coolant flow.
The results of the analyses discussed in this section are based on the Model-1 basket assembly. 
However, the results are also valid for Model-2 basket assembly (Ambrosek 1998b).  
 
Maximum Power in NW Lobe of 34 MW Operation
The I-24 position is located in the northwest (NW) quadrant of ATR. 
Chang (1997) estimated a maximum LHGR of 9.14 kW/ft for the test capsules with a NW lobe
power of 17 MW.  For the evaluation at 34 MW lobe power, a LHGR of 18.3 kW/ft was used.
Three-pump operation: The minimum DNBR was calculated to be in the capsule flow channels
on the surfaces of the capsules at the ends of the fuel stacks.  The minimum DNBR is 8.9.  The
minimum value of the flow stability criterion is 5.13 at the Al-Inconel (Model-1) gap channel
exit (Ott 1997).
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Two-pump operation: The minimum DNBR was calculated to be in the capsule flow channels on
the surfaces of the capsules at the ends of the fuel stacks.  The minimum DNBR is 8.06.  The
minimum value of the flow stability criterion is 4.24 at the Al-Inconel (Model-1) gap channel
exit (Ott 1997).
The DNBRs and Flow Instability Ratios are always greater than 2.0 for two or three
pump operation, which meets the ATR safety requirements.
Experiment Reactivity
As discussed in McCracken (1984), a reactivity worth of 1074 g U235 in a large I-hole was
measured to be less than 0.05$.  The amount of fissile material (35 g Pu) being introduced in the
I-24 hole position for this irradiation is equivalent to 70 g U235.  Therefore, this prompts the
conclusion that the reactivity insertion of the MOX experiment assembly is less than 0.01$.  This
0.01$ insertion is for a flat power scenario.  In a conservative bounding case, 100 MW relative
lobe power, reactivity insertion would be limited to 0.04$ (i.e., 0.01$*(100/50)).
6.2.2. Condition 2 Anticipated Events
The following Condition 2 events are assessed.
Perched Test Assembly
A perched test assembly that falls into place during reactor operation is an anticipated event. The
reactivity worth of the MOX test assembly is less than 0.01$, far below the 0.50$ reactivity limit
for an anticipated fault.  Therefore, a sudden drop in this assembly will not impact ATR
operation.
Clad Failure
For the purpose of this ESAP, failure of a fuel pin assembly zircaloy clad is considered to be an
anticipated fault.  The fuel pin assembly is encapsulated in a 304L stainless steel (SS) ASME
B&PV Code, Section III, Class 1 pressure vessel container as shown in Figure 1.  The thermal
hydraulic analysis with two-pump operation and an LHGR of 12 kW/ft shows that the capsule
surface temperature is expected to be less than 100 oC (Ott 1997).  Fission gas leak analysis
indicated that the capsule gas plenum essentially remains at local coolant temperature and
showed very little variation with almost no gas movement.  No release of fission products outside
of the stainless steel capsule is expected.
Flow coastdown with two primary pumps initially running
As defined in Polkinghorne (1994), one potential abnormal condition is coastdown of the
primary coolant system (PCS) pumps (with an associated reactor scram and with emergency
flow) from a NW lobe power of 34 MW with two primary coolant pumps initially running.  This
accident is initiated by a loss of commercial power to the site. The minimum DNBR for this
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event was calculated to be in the capsule flow channels on the surfaces of the capsules at the ends
of the fuel stacks.  The minimum DNBR is 6.54.  The minimum value of the flow stability
criterion is 2.66 at the Al-Inconel gap (Model-1) channel exit (Ott 1997).  Both of these values
are greater than 2.0, which meets the ATR safety requirements.  See Ambrosek (1998b) for
assessment of the Model-2 basket assembly.  No release of fission products is expected in any
anticipated event.  Therefore, the consequences and risks are acceptable. 
The MOX test assembly has been evaluated subjectively for natural convection cooling and for
response to a reactivity initiated transient, as related to the ATR TSR (ATR 1998) and the ATR
UFSAR (ATR 1999) compliance.
The rationale for requiring a DNBR and FIR greater than 2.0 is that an experiment is assured to
have a greater margin of safety than the driver core.  This leads to the requirement for assessment
at the ATR UFSAR 10.3.5.2.1 (ATR 1999) limits of lobe power for the irradiation position, since
the driver core limits are based on lobe power limits.  Provided there are no design features that
will cause a degradation of natural convection, such as a check valve to restrict reverse flow, the
experiment will have a safety margin not less than the driver core for natural convection cooling
when the decay heat has a response equivalent or less severe than the driver fuel.  The MOX
assembly has no reverse flow device to hinder natural convection.  Natural convection cooling in
the MOX assembly is expected to be better than in an ATR fuel element since a large portion of
the operational pressure drop is across an orifice.  The friction factor is usually higher for lower
velocity flow, while form loss coefficients are essentially the same.  The decay heating response
in the MOX assembly is essentially the same as the driver fuel (and the heating rates in terms of
watts per gram of fuel are always much less in the MOX capsules).
Natural convection cooling for the MOX assembly is bounded by the driver core response.
The argument for the ATR UFSAR 10.3.5.1.1 (ATR 1999) compliance as above also holds for a
reactivity initiated event.
The test requirements assure that the experiment will maintain margins greater than the driver
core.  The evaluations for DNBR and FIR at the maximum lobe power and during a flow
coastdown assure that for experiments cooled by primary coolant, the margins are not less than
for the driver core.
6.2.3. Condition 3 Unlikely Events
Each capsule assembly qualifies as a Class 1 pressure vessel and meets the appropriate rules as
specified in subsection NB, Section III, Division 1 of the ASME B&PV Code. Therefore, failure
of a single capsule assembly is defined as an unlikely fault.
In case of an unlikely event, activity in the primary coolant is estimated based on the following
assumptions:
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• Instantaneous release of 100% of gaseous fission products from the plenum of the highest
burnup capsule assembly (i.e., 3% of the total fission gas inventory) to the primary coolant,
• Fission gases include Xe, Kr, I, and Cs,
• Instantaneous homogeneous mixing in the PCS, i.e.; zero decay time,
Total PCS volume = 3.1E8 cc.
Using a nominal MOX fuel loading per capsule, an ORIGEN2 calculation of the radioactivity of
actinides and fission products of all MOX capsules was performed (Terry, 1998a).  Based on the
maximum fission gas activity in the highest-burnup capsule assembly, the peak release (see
Figure 9) from the failed capsule assembly results in less than 0.4 µCi/cc increase in the primary
coolant activity.  Normal primary coolant activity is 0.03 to 0.16 µCi/cc.  The reactor primary
coolant activity has a limit of 20 µCi/cc.  Therefore, failure of a single capsule assembly will not
approach the normal PCS activity operating limit.  The fission products from plutonium are
essentially the same as those from ATR fuel, so the potential stack release consequences from a
MOX capsule are enveloped by those from ATR fuel for any unlikely event.
6.2.4. Condition 4 Extremely Unlikely Events
Normally, the limiting credible fault associated with an irradiation program is an extremely
unlikely, complete flow blockage to the I-hole position.  The design of the MOX test assembly is
such that it provides several holes strategically located on the test assembly (three 2-inch-long
slots exist about 8 inches below the top of the test assembly).  Flow blockage at the top of the test
assembly may occur, but water would then flow in the slots to cool the MOX capsules. 
Therefore, water will always cool the capsules because blockage of any one flow path will not
result in complete flow blockage.
Simultaneous failure of two or more MOX capsule assemblies is assumed to be an extremely
unlikely fault.  Failure of a single capsule assembly would result in less than 0.4 µCi/cc in the
primary coolant.  Therefore, all nine MOX capsule assemblies can experience simultaneous
failures without exceeding the operating limit of 20 µCi/cc.
In the event of MOX fuel melting in the highest burnup capsule assembly, activity in the primary
coolant is estimated based on the following assumptions:
Instantaneous release of 21% of gaseous fission products plus 10% of the fission product
particulates from the highest burnup capsule assembly to the primary coolant,
Fission gases include Xe, Kr, I, and Cs,
Instantaneous homogeneous mixing in the PCS, i.e., zero decay time,
Total PCS volume = 3.1E8 cc.
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Figure 9.  PCS activity – unlikely event
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No mechanism for this scenario has been identified.  However, if the failure should occur,
calculation shows that the maximum increase in the primary coolant activity would be 8 µCi/cc,
see Figure 10, which is well below the reactor primary coolant activity limit of 20 µCi/cc.
Fission products generated by plutonium are essentially the same as those generated by the
uranium in the ATR fuel.  Any fission product release from the MOX capsules is enveloped by
potential releases from ATR fuel.  For example, the ATR limit on releasing fission product noble
gases up the stack is 450 Ci/day.  If we assume an instantaneous release of all the fission product
gases from the gas plenum in one MOX capsule, directly up the stack with no decay time or
filtering in the primary coolant or degassing tank, a maximum of 115 Ci will go up the stack. 
This is well within the ATR limit for stack release.
Because MOX fuel is 95% UO2, MOX fuel behaves very similar to UO2 fuel in commercial
nuclear reactors in both normal and accident conditions.  Also note that these capsules are nearly
10 times the density of water and will not float.
6.3. Canal Activities
Steps F, G, H, K, L, N, O, P, R , S, U, V, X, Y, Z , ZA, AA, AB, YA, YD, YE, YG, YH, YJ 
(Canal Activities)
6.3.1. Condition 1  Normal Operations:
Any movement of the MOX test assembly within the ATR canal area, or other operations
involving the irradiated MOX test assembly, will be performed and controlled under a specific
Radiological Work Permit (RWP).
Operations involving the MOX capsule assemblies in the ATR Canal (test assembly loading and
unloading) are performed, with monitoring by a Radiation Control Technician (RCT), by
personnel wearing dosimeters as specified in the RWP.  Personnel exposure rates are controlled
by adjusting the depth of the canal working tray, where the capsules are located, as necessary to
remain within the levels specified in the RWP.  Constant Air Monitors (CAMs) and Remote
Area Monitors (RAMs) are also in service as required by the Canal Operating and Maintenance
Manual.  ALARA principles are applied throughout the operation.   
In relation to the MOX experiment being stored in the canal, three event categories (Condition 2,
Condition 3, and Condition 4) are considered in the development of this ESAP.
6.3.2. Condition 2 Anticipated Event:
Dropping an irradiated MOX capsule to the bottom of the canal
Accidental dropping of a MOX capsule during handling in the ATR canal has been evaluated.  A
maximum heating rate as reported in Hodge 1997c, at approximately 8 GWd/MT and after 4 hrs
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Figure 10.  PCS activity – extremely unlikely event
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of cooling, was used.  The maximum surface temperature is expected to be less than 100 F, and
no boiling will occur on the capsule surface (Ambrosek 1997b). This precludes any potential for
dryout and temperature excursion.  These MOX capsules are nearly 10 times denser than water
and will not float.  Restrictions will be placed in the Reactor Loading Record and the CRD 16
letter to prohibit transfer of the test assembly out of the reactor and to the canal in less than 4
hours after a reactor scram.
6.3.3. Condition 3  Unlikely Events:
Minor damage to a single capsule
The MOX capsule assembly 304L SS outer pressure boundary meets ASME B&PV Code
Section III, Class 1.  Minor damage to a single capsule is assumed to be a bounding unlikely
event.  A release of two percent of the fission products from an ATR fuel plate is assumed to be
an unlikely scenario.  Total Pu inventories and two percent of the total fission products in an
average fuel plate, 8 hrs after reactor shutdown, are calculated to be 7 Ci and 6,700 Ci,
respectively (ATR 1999). In the highest-burnup MOX capsule assembly, total peak Pu
inventories, and two percent of the total fission products 4 hrs after the shutdown, are calculated
to be 2 Ci and 110 Ci, respectively.  The fission product source from the MOX capsules is much
less than that of an ATR fuel plate, so the dose consequences from a MOX capsule are less than
from a fuel plate.  Therefore, the consequences from the MOX capsule assembly are enveloped in
the case of an unlikely event of fission product gas release. (Based on 10% of gaseous fission
products released in the canal with instantaneous mixing and zero decay time in case of an
unlikely event, the activity in the Canal is estimated.  Using nominal MOX fuel loading per
capsule, an ORIGEN2 calculation of the radioactivity of actinides and fission products of a
single irradiated capsule was performed.  The maximum activity in the canal is calculated to be
less than 0.5 Ci/cc based on the canal water inventory.)
The use of the HCC #3, GE-100, or GE-2000 cask is governed by  ATR DOP 4.8.7, 4.8.36, and
4.8.4 respectively. The consequences of cask-drop unlikely events with any of these casks are
within the cask-drop events analyzed in the UFSAR and will not increase as a result of this MOX
fuel experiment.
Lifting an irradiated capsule out of the canal water
During the manipulation of the capsule assemblies in the canal on the working tray area, an
operator lifting an irradiated assembly up out of the water is an unlikely event. A special canal
tool is used to screw into the top of each capsule to lift it out of the test assembly and onto the
canal-working tray.  The operator may not be aware that a capsule is attached to the end of the
tool and could possibly lift it out of the canal water.  During capsule manipulation a person from
Radiological Control will be present and monitor any work in the canal.  It is expected that if the
dose rate at the canal working level exceeds the predetermined limit, the work will be stopped
and the canal working tray and capsule will be lowered in the canal.  It is expected that canal area
radiation alarms will also go off, warning personnel in case a capsule is pulled up too far.  The
movement of the test assembly in the canal is considered no different than movement of the ATR
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fuel element, and consequences are bounded by the lifting of an ATR fuel element out of the
water.
6.3.4. Condition 4  Extremely unlikely events:
Simultaneous minor damage to two capsules or a significant fuel meltdown of one entire capsule
A complete meltdown of an ATR fuel element is assumed to be an extremely unlikely scenario. 
Total fission products and total Pu inventories in an average fuel element, 8 hrs after the
shutdown, are calculated to be 6.3E6 Ci and 1.37E2 Ci, respectively (ATR 1999).  In the highest-
burnup MOX capsule assembly (assuming the complete meltdown of one capsule), total fission
products and total Pu inventories, 4 hrs after the shutdown, are calculated to be 5500 Ci and 2 Ci,
respectively.  The fission product and plutonium sources from the MOX capsule are much less
than that of an ATR fuel element, so the dose consequences from a MOX capsule are less than
from an ATR fuel element.  Therefore, the consequences from the MOX capsule assembly are
enveloped in the case of an extremely unlikely event. (Based on 100% of gaseous fission
products and 10% of the fission product particulate released in the canal in the case of an
extremely unlikely event, the activity in the Canal is estimated.   Using a nominal MOX fuel
loading per capsule, an ORIGEN 2 calculation of the radioactivity of actinides and fission
products of a single irradiated capsule was performed.  The maximum activity in the canal is
calculated to be 3.0 Ci/cc based on the canal water inventory.)
The use of the HCC #3, GE-100, or GE-2000 cask is governed by the ATR DOP 4.8.7, 4.8.36,
and 4.8.4 respectively.  The consequences of cask-drop extremely unlikely events with any of
these casks are within the cask-drop events analyzed in the UFSAR and will not increase as a
result of this MOX experiment.
6.4. Transport of unirradiated or irradiated capsule assemblies within TRA
Steps M, PA, XA, ZB, T, and YC Transport of unirradiated or irradiated capsule assemblies
within TRA
The transportation of the HCC #3 cask between TRA HCF and ATR canal is internally
controlled by DOP 4.8.19.  This DOP specifies the lift as a high consequence lift, the minimum
capacity for the forklift, limits the speed on the roadway, requires evaluation of road conditions
in winter.  These limitations assure that the probability of an upset, that could cause damage to
the cask and its contents, is low. 
Gentillo (1992) contains an engineering evaluation of HCC #3 cask.  The internal heatup of
capsule assemblies has been analyzed by Hawkes (1998) and found to be acceptable relative to
heat generation limits noted in Sherick (1992).
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All capsule assembly will be sealed in isotope shipping canister during transfer in HCC #3 cask
per DOP 4.8.46.  This sealed canister provides additional barrier to prevent release if one of the
capsules fails.
6.5. Cask Handling and Shipping Activity
Steps PB, X, ZA, ZC, AB, and YB Shipping activity (Cask Handling and HCF)
The safety envelope for cask handling within the ATR is established by the ATR TSR 3.5.5,
Cask Handling and Irradiated Fuel Storage (ATR 1998) and the ATR UFSAR (ATR 1999), and
cask Certificates of Compliance.  The loaded cask will be transported to ORNL per applicable
DOE, DOT and NRC requirements.
The GE-100 cask at the TRA HCF will be loaded in accordance with HCF procedures that reflect
the facility’s operating requirements and cask Certificate of Compliance requirements.  The
loaded cask will be transported to ORNL per applicable DOE, DOT and NRC requirements.
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7.  PLANT PROTECTION CRITERIA
This section discusses the four conditions for the Plant Protection Criteria for each of the process
steps. 
7.1. Condition 1 Events
Condition 1: Normal Operation.  The condition 1 operations are expected to occur frequently or
regularly in the course of reactor operations, refueling or maintenance.
Radiation Exposure Limits - Off-site - 100 mrem/year effective dose equivalent (EDE) and 10
mrem/year EDE from airborne release; Worker - 5 rem/year total effective dose equivalent
(TEDE).
Barrier Protection Limits - The integrity of the ATR fuel cladding is not challenged in Condition
1 except for limited clad defects.
7.1.1. Irradiate the test assembly
Steps E, J, Q, W, and YF – Irradiate the test assembly
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 1 events associated with irradiating the
MOX capsules experiment that could cause off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure,
RADCON controls for all of the handling activities are performed in accordance with the
Radiation Protection Manual. 
Barrier Protection - There have been no Condition 1 events associated with experiment
irradiation that have been identified that could possibly lead to ATR fuel cladding damage.
7.1.2. Canal Activities 
Steps F, I, K, R, Y, and YG – Transfer the test assembly to Canal
Steps H, O, V, and YE - Insert the test assembly in the Reactor
Steps G, and I  – Replace the test assembly flux monitors
Steps L, N, S, U, Z, YD, and YH – Disassemble/assemble the test assembly on the working tray
in the ATR Canal
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 1 events associated with the canal
activity steps listed as above that could cause off-site exposure. To limit worker exposure,
RADCON controls for all of the handling activities are performed in accordance with the
Radiation Protection Manual. Operations involving the MOX capsule assemblies and the MOX
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test assembly are performed with monitoring by a Radiological Control Technician (RCT) as
specified in the Radiological Work Permit (RWP).
Barrier Protection - No Condition 1 events associated with disassembling and assembling the test
assembly on the working tray in the ATR canal have been identified that could possibly lead to
damage to the fuel cladding. 
7.1.3. Transfer unirradiated or irradiated MOX fuel and dummy capsule
assemblies and basket assembly.
Steps M, PA, PB, T, XA, X, ZB, ZC, YB, YC, AB, and ZA – Transfer unirradiated or irradiated
MOX fuel and dummy capsule assemblies and basket assembly
Note:  The following assessment of Plant Protection Criteria only applies to the specified process
steps after the capsules enter the ATR facility.  Once the shipping container leaves the ATR, the
applicable Department of Transportation (DOT) Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) or DOP (for
HCC #3) control the shipment, and this experiment is not under the control of the ATR UFSAR.
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 1 events associated with transferring
unirradiated or irradiated MOX fuel, dummy capsule assemblies, and basket assemblies that
could cause off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all of the
handling activities are performed in accordance with the Radiation Protection Manual. 
Barrier Protection - There are no Condition 1 events associated with transferring unirradiated or
irradiated MOX fuel, dummy capsule assemblies, and basket assemblies that have been identified
that could possibly lead to damage to the ATR fuel cladding. 
7.1.4. Store the irradiated capsule assemblies in the ATR Canal
Steps P, X, AA, and YA - Store the irradiated capsule assemblies in the ATR Canal
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 1 events associated with storage of the
irradiated capsule assemblies and the loading of the shipping cask that could cause off-site
exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all of the handling activities are
performed in accordance with the Radiation Protection Manual. 
Barrier Protection - There are no Condition 1 events associated with storage of the irradiated
capsule assemblies and the loading of the shipping cask that have been identified that could
possibly lead to damage to the ATR fuel cladding.
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7.2. Condition 2 Faults
Condition 2: Anticipated Faults.  The condition 2 anticipated fault is an off-normal condition
that is expected to occur once or more during the lifetime of the facility due to an expected single
fault.
Radiation Exposure Limits - Off-site - 0.5 rem/year TEDE; Worker - 5 rem/year TEDE.
Barrier Protection Limits - No rupture of the fuel plate cladding is allowable unless the clad
failure is the initiating fault.  For canal accidents no melting of the fuel plate cladding is allowed.
7.2.1. Irradiate the test assembly
Steps E, I, J, Q, W and YF – Irradiate the test assembly
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 2 faults associated with irradiating the
MOX capsules experiment that could cause off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure,
RADCON controls for all of the handling activities are performed in accordance with the
Radiation Protection Manual. 
Barrier Protection - There have been no Condition 2 faults associated with experiment irradiation
that have been identified that could possibly lead to ATR fuel cladding damage. The reactivity
worth for the experiment was calculated to be less than 0.01$.
7.2.2. Canal Activities 
Steps F, I, K, R, Y, and YG – Transfer the test assembly to Canal
Steps H, O, V, and YE – Insert the Test Assembly in the Reactor
Steps G, and I  – Replace the test assembly flux monitors
Steps L, N, S, U, Z, YD, and YH – Disassemble/assemble the test assembly on the working tray
in the ATR Canal
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 2 faults associated with the canal
activities listed in steps above that could cause off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure,
RADCON controls for all of the handling activities are performed in accordance with the
Radiation Protection Manual. Operations involving the MOX capsule assemblies and the MOX
test assembly are performed with monitoring by a RCT as specified in the RWP. 
Accidental dropping of a MOX capsule during handling in the ATR canal has been evaluated.  A
maximum heating rate as reported in (Hodge, 1997c), at approximately 8GWd/MT and after four
hours of cooling, was used.  The maximum surface temperature is expected to be less than 100 F,
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and no boiling will occur on the capsule surface (Ambrosek, 1997b).  This precludes any
potential for dry out and temperature excursion.  These MOX capsules are nearly ten times
denser than water and will not float.
Barrier Protection - There are no Condition 2 faults associated with disassembling and
assembling the test assembly on the working tray in the ATR canal that have been identified that
could possibly lead to damage to the ATR fuel cladding.  Dropping a MOX capsule assembly or
the MOX test assembly as it is handled will not damage ATR fuel element cladding, as the fuel
elements are stored in a different section of the canal located away from the working tray.
7.2.3. Transport of unirradiated and  irradiated capsule assemblies and basket
assembly
Steps M, PA, PB, T, XA, X, ZB, ZC, YB, YC, AB, and ZA – Transport of unirradiated and 
irradiated capsule assemblies and basket assembly
Note:  The following assessment of Plant Protection Criteria only applies to the specified process
steps after the capsules enter the ATR facility.  Once the shipping container leaves the ATR, the
applicable Department of Transportation (DOT) Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), or DOP
(for HCC #3) control the shipment, and this experiment is not under the control of the ATR
UFSAR.
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 2 events associated with transferring
unirradiated or irradiated MOX fuel, dummy capsule assemblies, and basket assemblies that
could cause off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all of the
handling activities are performed in accordance with the Radiation Protection Manual. 
Barrier Protection - There are no Condition 2 events associated with transferring unirradiated or
irradiated MOX fuel, dummy capsule assemblies, and basket assemblies that could cause off-site
exposure.  Dropping any MOX capsule assembly as it is handled will not damage ATR fuel
element cladding as the fuel elements are required to be properly stored upright in either the fuel
annulus, fuel storage grids, or the fuel storage baskets in the vessel.
7.2.4. Store the irradiated capsule assemblies in the ATR Canal
Steps P, X, AA, and YA – Store the irradiated capsule assemblies in the ATR Canal
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 2 faults associated with storage of the
irradiated MOX capsule assemblies and the loading of the shipping cask that could cause off-site
exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all of the handling activities are
performed in accordance with the Radiation Protection Manual. 
Barrier Protection - There are no Condition 2 faults associated with storage of the irradiated
MOX capsule assemblies and the loading of the shipping cask that have been identified that
could possibly lead to damage to the ATR fuel cladding.
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7.3. Condition 3 Faults
Condition 3: The Condition 3, unlikely faults, are faults that may occur infrequently during the
life of the plant.
Radiation Exposure Limits - Off-site and evacuation worker - 6.25 rem whole body and 75 rem
thyroid dose.
Barrier Protection Limits – The reactor primary coolant pressure boundary must be maintained
unless its failure is the initiator.  No large releases of uranium or fission products to the primary
coolant system will occur.
7.3.1. Irradiate the test assembly
Steps E, I, J, Q, W and YF – Irradiate the test assembly
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 3 faults associated with irradiating the
MOX capsules experiment that could cause unacceptable off-site exposure.  To limit worker
exposure, RADCON controls for all of the handling activities are performed in accordance with
the Radiation Protection Manual. The stack release consequences for the MOX test assembly are
enveloped by those from the ATR fuel for any unlikely events.
Barrier Protection - There have been no Condition 3 faults associated with experiment irradiation
that have been identified that could possibly lead to ATR primary coolant pressure boundary
damage. No Condition 3 faults associated with MOX capsule irradiation that have been identified
that could possibly lead to large releases of uranium or fission products to the primary coolant. 
See Section 6.2.3 for discussion of failure of a single capsule assembly. 
7.3.2. Canal Activities 
Steps F, I, K, R, Y, and YG – Transfer the test assembly to Canal
Steps H, O, V, and YE – Insert the Test Assembly in the Reactor
Steps G, and I  – Replace the test assembly flux monitors
Steps L, N, S, U, Z, YD, and YH – Disassemble/assemble the test assembly on the working tray
in the ATR Canal
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 3 events associated with disassembling
and assembling the MOX test assembly on the working tray in the ATR canal that could cause
unacceptable off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all of the
handling activities are performed in accordance with the Radiation Protection Manual.
Operations involving the MOX capsule assemblies and the MOX test assembly are performed
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with monitoring by a Radiological Control Technician (RCT) as specified in the Radiological
Work Permit (RWP).
The total amount of Pu and fission products releasable from the MOX test assembly experiment
is bounded by the ATR fuel for any unlikely event.  See Section 6 for an assessment of a fault
involving lifting an irradiated capsule out of the canal.
Barrier Protection - There are no Condition 3 events associated with disassembling and
assembling the MOX test assembly on the working tray in the ATR canal that have been
identified that could possibly lead to damage to the ATR primary coolant pressure boundary.  
7.3.3. Transport of unirradiated and  irradiated capsule assemblies and basket
assemblies
Steps M, PA, PB, T, XA, X, ZB, ZC, YB, YC, AB, and ZA – Transport of unirradiated and 
irradiated capsule assemblies and basket assembly
Note:  The following assessment of Plant Protection Criteria only applies to the specified process
steps after the capsules enter the TRA facility.  Once the shipping container leaves the ATR, the
applicable Department of Transportation (DOT) Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), or DOP
(for HCC #3) control the shipment, and this experiment is not under the control of the ATR
UFSAR.
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 3 faults associated with transferring
unirradiated or irradiated MOX fuel, dummy capsule assemblies, and basket assemblies that
could cause unacceptable off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all
of the handling activities are performed in accordance with the Radiation Protection Manual. 
Barrier Protection - There are no identified Condition 3 faults associated with transferring
unirradiated or irradiated MOX fuel, dummy capsule assemblies, and basket assemblies that
could possibly lead to damage to the ATR primary coolant pressure boundary. 
7.3.4. Store the irradiated capsule assemblies in the ATR Canal
Steps P, X, AA, and YA – Store the irradiated capsule assemblies in the ATR Canal
The following cask handling and fuel element damage faults have been classified as Condition 3
faults (ATR 1999):
1. Dropping a heavy cask from an elevation of less than one foot above the canal floor or
other small or limited failure of the storage canal.
2. Dropping a heavy cask from one foot above parapet within the restricted cask-lifting areas
of the canal.
3. Dropping a heavy cask onto the floor north of the canal.
4. Minor damage to one fuel element in the canal with a minor fission product release.
MOX FUEL IRRADIATION ESAP
DAR No.: MOX-ESAP-3 May 2000
49
As shown in ATR UFSAR Chapter 15, these faults will meet the ATR Plant Protection Criteria
for primary coolant pressure boundary protection and radiation exposure if the cask handling
requirements in the ATR TSR and UFSAR are followed. Compliance with the ATR TSR and
UFSAR for this experiment is demonstrated in Section 5 of this ESAP.
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 3 faults associated with storage of the
irradiated capsule assemblies and the loading of the shipping cask that could cause unacceptable
off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all of the handling activities
are performed in accordance with Radiation Protection Manual.
During the manipulation of the capsule assemblies in the canal on the working tray area, an
operator lifting an irradiated assembly up out of the water, is an unlikely event.  A special canal
tool is used to screw into the top of each capsule to lift it out of the test assembly and onto the
canal working tray.  The operator may not be aware that a capsule is attached to the end of the
tool and could possibly lift it out of the canal water.  During capsule manipulation, a person from
Radiological Control will be present and monitor any work in the canal.  It is expected that if the
dose rate at the canal working level exceeds the predetermined limit, the work will be stopped
and the canal working tray and capsule will be lowered in the canal.  It is expected the canal area
radiation alarms will also go off, warning personnel in case a capsule is pulled up too far.  The
movement of the test assembly in the canal is considered no different than movement of the ATR
fuel element, and consequences are bounded by the lifting of an ATR fuel element out of the
water. 
Minor damage to a single MOX capsule has been established as a bounding Condition 3 fault
(which is enveloped by the UFSAR fault for fuel element damage, noted above).  See the MOX
capsule damage assessment in Section 6.3.2.
Barrier Protection - There are no Condition 3 events associated with storage of the irradiated
capsule assemblies and the loading of the shipping cask that have been identified that could
possibly lead to damage to the ATR primary coolant pressure boundary.
7.4. Condition 4 Faults 
Condition 4: The condition 4, Extremely Unlikely Faults, are low-probability faults that are not
expected to occur but are postulated because their consequences include the potential for release
of significant quantities of radioactive material.
Radiation Exposure Limits - Off-site and evacuation worker - 25 rem whole body and 300 rem
thyroid dose.
Barrier Protection Limits - The primary coolant pressure boundary must be maintained unless its
failure is the initiator, and the reactor confinement must not be damaged.
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7.4.1. Irradiate the test assembly
Steps E, I, J, Q, W, and YF – Irradiate the test assembly
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 4 faults associated with irradiating the
MOX capsules experiment that could cause unacceptable off-site exposure.  To limit worker
exposure, RADCON controls for all of the handling activities are performed in accordance with
the Radiation Protection Manual. The release consequences from the experiment are enveloped
by those from ATR fuel for any extremely unlikely events. See Section 6  (Simultaneous failure
of two MOX capsules).
Barrier Protection - There have been no Condition 4 faults associated with MOX test assembly
irradiation that have been identified that could possibly lead to ATR primary coolant pressure
boundary or confinement damage.
7.4.2. Canal Activities
Steps F, I, K, R, Y, and YG – Transfer the test assembly to Canal
Steps H, O, V, and YE – Insert the Test Assembly in the Reactor
Steps G, and I  – Replace the test assembly flux monitors
Steps L, N, S, U, Z, YD, and YH – Disassemble/assemble the test assembly on the working tray
in the ATR Canal
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 4 events associated with disassembling
and assembling the test assembly on the working tray in the ATR canal that could cause off-site
exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all of the handling activities are
performed in accordance with Radiation Protection Manual. Operations involving the MOX
capsule assemblies and the MOX test assembly are performed with monitoring by a RCT as
specified in the RWP.
The Condition 4 events of simultaneous minor damage to two capsules or a significant fuel
meltdown of one entire capsule are discussed in Section 6.
The total amount of Pu and fission products releasable from the MOX experiment is bounded by
the ATR fuel for any extremely unlikely event.
Barrier Protection - There has been no Condition 4 faults associated with disassembling and
assembling the MOX test assembly on the working tray in the ATR canal that have been
identified that could possibly lead to damage to the ATR primary coolant pressure boundary or
confinement damage. 
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7.4.3. Transport of unirradiated and  irradiated capsule assemblies and basket
assemblies
Steps M, PA, PB, T, XA, X, ZB, ZC, YB, YC, AB, and ZA – Transport of unirradiated and
irradiated capsule assemblies and basket assembly
Note:  The following assessment of Plant Protection Criteria only applies to the specified process
steps after the capsules enter the ATR facility.  Once the shipping container leaves the ATR, the
applicable DOT CFR regulations, or DPO (for HCC #3) control the shipment and this
experiment is not under the control of the ATR UFSAR.
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 4 faults associated with transferring
unirradiated or irradiated MOX fuel, dummy capsule assemblies, and basket assemblies that
could cause unacceptable off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all
of the handling activities are performed in accordance with the Radiation Protection Manual.
Barrier Protection - There are no Condition 4 faults associated with transferring unirradiated or
irradiated MOX fuel, dummy capsule assemblies, and basket assemblies that has been identified
that could possibly lead to damage to the ATR primary coolant pressure boundary or
confinement damage. 
7.4.4. Store the irradiated capsule assemblies in the ATR Canal
Steps P, X, AA, and YA – Store the irradiated capsule assemblies in the ATR Canal and ship to
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)
Radiation Exposure - There are no identified Condition 4 events associated with storage of the
irradiated MOX capsule assemblies and the loading of the shipping cask that could cause
unacceptable off-site exposure.  To limit worker exposure, RADCON controls for all of the
handling activities are performed in accordance with the Radiation Protection Manual. The total
amount of Pu and fission products releasable from the MOX experiment is bounded by the ATR
fuel for any extremely unlikely event.  The extremely unlikely events of simultaneous minor
damage to two capsules or a significant fuel meltdown of one entire capsule are discussed in
Section 6.
Barrier Protection - There are no Condition 4 faults associated with storage of the irradiated
MOX capsule assemblies and the loading of the shipping cask that have been identified that
could possibly lead to damage to the ATR primary coolant pressure boundary or confinement
damage.
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8. UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS
Operation with the MOX capsule experiment is within the safety envelope of the ATR TSR and
the UFSAR as demonstrated in the TSR/UFSAR Compliance Table, and explained in detail in
this Experiment Safety Assurance Package.  The conduct of this experiment:
1. Does not change the probability of occurrence of the accidents evaluated in the safety
envelope.
2. Does not change the consequences of the accidents evaluated in the safety envelope.
3. Does not change the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to
safety, evaluated in the safety envelope.
4. Does not change the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety,
evaluated in the safety envelope.
5. Does not create different types of accidents from those identified in the safety envelope.
6. Does not create different types of malfunctions of equipment important to safety from
those identified in the safety envelope.
7. Does not reduce the margin of safety from that identified in the safety envelope.
Therefore, the conduct of this experiment does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
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9. CONCLUSIONS
Operation with the MOX capsule experiment is within the safety envelope of the ATR TSR and
the UFSAR, and the experiment can proceed as planned.
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